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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, big data systems (e.g., Hadoop and Spark) are being widely adopted by many domains
for offering effective data solutions, such as manufacturing, healthcare, education, and media. A
common problem about big data systems is called anomaly, e.g., a status deviated from normal exe-
cution, which decreases the performance of computation or kills running programs. It is becoming
a necessity to detect anomalies and analyze their causes. An effective and economical approach is
to analyze system logs. Big data systems produce numerous unstructured logs that contain buried
valuable information. However manually detecting anomalies from system logs is a tedious and
daunting task.
This dissertation proposes four approaches that can accurately and automatically analyze anoma-
lies from big data system logs without extra monitoring overhead. Moreover, to detect abnormal
tasks in Spark logs and analyze root causes, we design a utility to conduct fault injection and col-
lect logs from multiple compute nodes. (1) Our first method is a statistical-based approach that
can locate those abnormal tasks and calculate the weights of factors for analyzing the root causes.
In the experiment, four potential root causes are considered, i.e., CPU, memory, network, and
disk I/O. The experimental results show that the proposed approach is accurate in detecting ab-
normal tasks as well as finding the root causes. (2) To give a more reasonable probability result
and avoid ad-hoc factor weights calculating, we propose a neural network approach to analyze root
causes of abnormal tasks. We leverage General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) to identify
root causes for abnormal tasks. The likelihood of reported root causes is presented to users ac-
cording to the weighted factors by GRNN. (3) To further improve anomaly detection by avoiding
feature extraction, we propose a novel approach by leveraging Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNN). Our proposed model can automatically learn event relationships in system logs and detect
anomaly with high accuracy. Our deep neural network consists of logkey2vec embeddings,
iii
three 1D convolutional layers, a dropout layer, and max pooling. According to our experiment, our
CNN-based approach has better accuracy compared to other approaches using Long Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) and Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) on detecting anomaly in Hadoop Distributed
File System (HDFS) logs. (4) To analyze system logs more accurately, we extend our CNN-based
approach with two attention schemes to detect anomalies in system logs. The proposed two at-
tention schemes focus on different features from CNN’s output. We evaluate our approaches with
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Big data system plays an increasingly important role along with the rapid growth of massive data
size. Several parallel computing frameworks have been widely used in real-world applications
such as Dryad [31], Hadoop [1], and Spark [2]. When these big data systems process numerous
data in parallel on distributed file systems [65, 23, 11, 59], they also produce massive logs. In
order to scrutinize problems in big data systems and improve their performance, these logs can
be leveraged to mine crucial information for performance tuning. Log-based anomaly detection is
one of common approaches to improve security and performance.
When anomalies happen, programs could be terminated or impacted, and the performance of com-
putation will be decreased. System logs will record all execution histories of programs. However,
analyzing these logs is very challenging. It is very hard to analyze their root causes by only using
system logs, because the logs are numerous and various. For example, Hadoop and Spark applica-
tions often demand long execution duration, thus huge size of logs will be generated [55, 56, 47].
Furthermore, each system may employ its own logging framework such as log4j [22] and self4j [3];
hence log formats could be diverse. Human-based manual detection methods are time-consuming
with low accuracy. To identify anomalies from different logging frameworks, it requires that users
are very familiar with the whole systems. Moreover, some unexpected events happening during
the program execution might cause big performance degradation, or failures, even some worst
scenarios such as programs keep quit, and stragglers happened without error message. Those sce-
narios are hard to be detected manually, even for system experts. Therefore, to effectively detect
anomalies from such huge and unstructured logs is a big challenge for system operators.
In this dissertation, we propose four approaches that can accurately and automatically analyze
anomalies from big data system logs. Moreover, to detect abnormal tasks in Spark logs and analyze
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root causes, we design a utility to conduct fault injection and collect logs from multiple compute
nodes.
• Our first method is a statistical approach that can locate those abnormal tasks and calculate
the weights of factors for analyzing root causes. In the experiment, four potential root causes
are considered, i.e., CPU, memory, network, and disk I/O. The experimental results show that
the proposed approach is accurate in detecting abnormal tasks as well as finding root causes.
• To give a more reasonable probability result and avoid ad-hoc factor weight calculation, we
propose a neural network approach to analyze root causes of abnormal tasks. We leverage
General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) to identify root causes for abnormal tasks.
• To further improve anomaly detection by avoiding feature extraction, we propose a novel
approach by leveraging Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). Our proposed model can
automatically learn event relationships in system logs and detect anomalies with high accu-
racy. Our deep neural network consists of logkey2vec embeddings, three 1D convolutional
layers, a dropout layer, and max pooling. According to our experiment, our CNN-based ap-
proach has better accuracy compared to other approaches using Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) and Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) on detecting anomalies in Hadoop Distributed
File System (HDFS) logs.
• To analyze system logs more accurately, we extend our CNN-based approach with two at-
tention schemes to detect anomalies in system logs. The proposed two attention schemes
focus on different features from CNN’s output. We evaluate our approaches with several
benchmarks, the attention-based CNN model shows the best performance among all state-
of-the-art methods. Additionally, we use an internal attention scheme to create adversarial
examples for evaluating the robustness of neural network approaches for log analysis.
2














































Figure 1.1: Spark framework and log files
Apache Hadoop [1] is a popular big data computing platform by leveraging MapReduce computing
framework that splits input data sets into independent chunks in parallel. The framework sorts the
outputs of maps, which are then fed to reduce tasks. The framework takes care of scheduling tasks,
monitoring them and re-executes the failed tasks. Typically, both input and output of jobs are
stored on a file system called Hadoop distributed file system (HDFS) [9], which is a distributed,
scalable, and portable file-system written in Java for the Hadoop framework. Hadoop ecosystem
consists of a few components such as HDFS, PIG, ZOOKEEPER, and YARN.
Beside of the above, Apache Spark [2] is a fast and general engine for large-scale data processing.
In order to achieve scalability and fault tolerance, Spark introduces resilient distributed dataset
(RDD), which represents a read-only collection of objects partitioned across a set of machines that
can be rebuilt if a partition is lost. As shown in Figure 1.1, Spark cluster consists of one master
node and several slave nodes, named as workers, which may contain one or more executors. When
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a Spark application is submitted, the master will request computing resources from the resource
manager based on the requirement of the application. When the resource is ready, Spark scheduler
distributes tasks to all executors to run in parallel. During this process, the master node will moni-
tor the status of executors and collect results from worker nodes. When an application is submitted
to Spark, the cluster manager will allocate compute resources according to the requirement of the
application, then Spark scheduler distributes tasks to executors, and tasks will be executed in par-
allel. During this process, Spark driver node will monitor the status of executors and collect tasks
results from worker nodes. In order to parallelize a job, Spark scheduler divides an application
into a series of stages based on data dependence [66]. The tasks within a stage do not have data
dependence and usually execute the same function.
Spark and Hadoop both use “log4j”, a Java logging framework, as its logging framework. Spark
users can customize “log4j” by changing configuration parameters, such as log level, log pattern,
and log direction. In our experiment, we use the default configurations in “log4j”. As shown in Fig-
ure 1.2, each line of Spark execution log contains four types of information: timestamp with ISO
format, logging level (INFO, WARNING, or ERROR), related class (which class prints out this
message) and message content. A message content contains two main kinds of information: con-
stant keywords (Finished task in stage TID in ms on), and variables (1.0 1.0
47 14075..).
During the execution of a Spark application, JVM monitors memory usage and outputs its status
to GC logs when garbage collection is invoked. GC logs report two kinds of memory usage: heap
space and young generation space, where young generation space is a part of heap memory space
to store new objects. Figure 1.3 shows an example of Spark JVM GC log, where “Allocation
Failure” invokes this GC operation, and “PSYoungGen” shows the usage of young generation
memory space. In “95744K->9080K(111616K)”, the first numeric is the young space before this
GC happens, the second one is the young space after this GC, and the last one is the total young
4
memory space. Similarly, “95744K->9088K(367104K)” illustrates heap memory instead of young
generation space.
17/02/22 21:04:02.259 INFO
TaskSetManager: Starting task 12.0 in stage 1.0 (TID 58, 10.190.128.101, partition 12, ANY, 5900 bytes)
17/02/22 21:04:02.259 INFO
CoarseGrainedSchedulerBackend$DriverEndpoint: Launching task 58 on executor id: 1 hostname: 10.190.128.101.
17/02/22 21:04:02.276 INFO
TaskSetManager: Finished task 1.0 in stage 1.0 (TID 47) in 14075 ms on 10.190.128.101 (1/384)
Figure 1.2: An example of Spark execution log.
GC (Allocation Failure)
PSYoungGen: 95744K->9080K(111616K)
95744K->9088K(367104K), 0.0087250 secs] [Times: user=0.03, sys=0.01, real=0.01 secs]
Figure 1.3: An example of Spark garbage collection (GC) log.
1.2 Anomaly Tasks
Anomaly could be identified as an abnormal execution of a program. It could be a task straggler,
error, and even some programming warning. For root cause analysis, we only consider four kinds
of resource failures, i.e., CUP, DISK, IO, and Networks.
A log entry (logline) is considered as anomaly if it contains abnormal key words (e.g. “error”,
“warning”) or shows significant unexpected order in context, such as a Spark executor restarts re-
peatedly before it stops working. Classical anomaly detection has been studied for many years.
Various algorithms and methods have been developed, such as basic keyword searching, regula-
tion expression matching, traditional statistical and machine learning approaches. It may incor-
rectly identify anomalies and report false positives when searching anomalies with key words, or
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matching with regular expression.
Hence, some techniques such as Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Principal Component Anal-
ysis (PCA) are often used to reduce the complexity of feature set to be analyzed and improve
accuracy. However, the hidden relationships in extracted feature set are still very difficult to be an-
alyzed by these aforementioned approaches, which often require more sophisticated approaches.
However, those features may be produced by ad-hoc and it would mislead the approach to learn
knowledge from the wrong rules. Anomaly logs are not only output with critical levels or some
keywords (error, warning) but also be printed out with different execution paths without special
keyword.
In recent years, deep learning approaches are leveraged in the log analysis domain to improve
automation and accuracy. For instance, Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) and Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN) are used by [17, 10] to detect anomalies with high accuracy to avoid ad-hoc feature
extraction. Within all deep learning methods, Convolutional Neural Network (CNNs) could be
the most famous and widely used approach, which has obtained great achievements in computer
vision. Due to convolution layers, the CNN-based approach can learn the hidden relationships with
higher accuracy than other deep learning methods.
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are our four anomaly detection approaches. This disser-
tation mainly focuses on analyzing logs of big data systems, but the techniques can also be applied
to other systems.
• Our offline approaches can accurately locate where and when abnormal tasks happen based
on analyzing only Spark logs. Those approaches detect root causes of abnormal tasks ac-
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cording to Spark logs without any monitoring data, thus it does not have any monitoring
overhead.
• Our offline approaches provides an easy way for users to deeply understand Spark logs and
tune Spark performance, and it gives a reasonable probability results for root cause analysis.
• We propose a CNN-based approach for anomaly detection of HDFS logs.
• We propose two attention schemes to improve the accuracy of log-based anomaly detection
of HDFS logs.
• A new embedding method called logkey2vec is designed to learn how to map logkeys to
vectors.
• We propose an efficient attention-based optimization method to manipulate discrete text
structure according to its embedding representation.
• We investigate the robustness of a classifier trained with adversarial examples by studying
its effectiveness to attack the networks.
1.4 Organization
This dissertation describes four approaches that can accurately analyze anomalies from big data
system logs without extra monitoring overhead. Chapter 2 surveys the related work about anomaly
detection for logs. Chapter 3 illustrates the statistical methodology to detect abnormal tasks in
Spark logs and analyze root causes. Chapter 4 proposes a GRNN neural network based approach
for detecting abnormal tasks and analyze root causes from Spark logs. Chapter 5 presents CNN
based anomalies detection from HDFS logs. Chapter 6 applies two attention schemes on CNN
based approach for log analysis from HDFS logs. Chapter 7 proposes a white-box adversarial
7
attack on CNN for anomalies detection. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes this dissertation and future
work.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we first review related work of log processing, and then classify the related work
of log-based anomaly detection into three categories: statistical approaches, traditional machine
learning approaches, and neural network-based approaches.
2.1 Log Processing Approaches
17/02/22 21:04:02.259 INFO TaskSetManager: Starting task 12.0 in stage 1.0 (TID 58, 10.190.128.101, partition 12, ANY, 5900 bytes)
.....
17/02/22 21:04:02.276 INFO TaskSetManager: Finished task 1.0 in stage 1.0 (TID 47) in 14075 ms on 10.190.128.101 (1/384)
Figure 2.1: Spark system log example
Big data system logs are unstructured data printed in time sequence. Normally, each log entry (line)
can be divided into two different parts: constant and variable. The constant part is the messages
printed directly by statements in the source code. Log keys can be extracted from these constant
parts, where log keys are the common constant messages in all similar log entries. For example,
as shown in Figure 2.1, the log key is “Starting task in stage TID partition bytes” in the log entry
“Starting task 12.0 in stage 1.0 (TID 58, 10.190.128.101, partition 12, ANY, 5900 bytes)”. The
other part is remaining after removing constant parts in log entries, which may contain variable
keywords such as “12.0 1.0 58 10.190.128.101, 12, ANY, 5900”.
Detecting anomalies from system logs (such as Spark logs) requires log analysis, i.e., analyzing
root causes [44] using effective methods. Usually, log analysis consists of four main phases:
1. Parse unstructured raw logs into structure data by log parser techniques. There are two
kinds of log parsing approaches [25]: heuristic and clustering. The clustering methods first
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conduct clustering based on distances result of logs, then create a log template from each
cluster. The heuristic methods count every word’s appearance in these log entries and select
frequently appeared words to be log events according to the predefined rules.
2. Extract log related features from parsed data. Different approaches may use different fea-
ture extraction methods (such as rule-based approach or execution path approach). There
are several common window-based approaches for extracting different features such as ses-
sion window, sliding window, and fixed window. Specifically, a session window is used for
grouping log entries with the same session ID. A sliding window is used to slide forward in
a certain step in the data and extract features with some overlaps. A fixed size of window
can also be used to extract features.
3. Detect anomalies with extracted features, which are introduced in details in Subsection 2.3.
4. Fix problems based on detected anomalies. There are many different ways to help fix prob-
lems based on detected anomalies, such as root cause analysis, anomalies visualization. For
example, [61] leverages a decision tree to visualize the anomalies, and [44] uses linear
regression to compute the probability of abnormal tasks.
2.2 Root Cause Categories
There are several categories of the root causes for the abnormal performances. Ananthanarayanan
etal. [6] identify three categories of root causes for Map-Reduce outliers: the key role cause is ma-
chine characteristics (resource problems), the other two causes are network and data skew problem.
Ibidunmoye et al. [30] depict that four root causes may cause bottlenecks, which are system re-
source, workload size, platform problems, and application (buggy codes). Garbageman et al. [20]
analyzes around 20-day cloud center data and summarizes that the most common root cause in
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cloud center of abnormal occurrence is server resource utilization, and data skew problems only
take 3% of total root causes. According to the above studies on a real-world experiment, the pri-
mary root causes of abnormal tasks are machine resources, which include CPU, memory, network,
and disk I/O. Moreover, the mentioned resource root causes mainly impact the performance of
CPS computation layers. Therefore, in our work, we consider only the four main root causes and
ignore data skew and ineffective code problems.
2.3 Anomaly Detection Approaches
.
Statistical and machine learning techniques are promising approaches in the root cause analysis and
anomaly detection. in the parallel computing area, solving the performance degradation problem
caused by abnormal executions is one of the critical tasks in log analysis. Basically, it is used
for detecting target patterns that differ from normal execution behaviors. Existing approaches in
anomaly detection mainly use three kinds of techniques: statistical method, traditional machine
learning, and deep learning approach. The first two are considered to be traditional log analysis
approaches.
2.3.1 Statistical Log Analysis Approaches
As one kind of common approaches for log analysis, statistical methods can analyze logs without
training or learning stages, instead, they use rule-based and static analysis methods for classifi-
cation such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Factor Analysis (FA). Tan et al. [58]
introduce a pure off-line state machine tool called SALSA, which simulates data flows and control
flows in big data systems with a statistical method, and leverages Hadoop’s historical execution
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logs. Similarly, Aguilera et al. [5] uses two kinds of statistical methods on distributed historical
logs and monitoring data to discover causal paths (workflow). Moreover, Xu et al. [61] extract
two kinds of log variable vectors by using a syntax tree (AST) to parse the system source code,
then analyze extracted patterns from the vectors by leveraging PCA. Safyallah et al. [53] lever-
age a log-based approach to analyze frequent and common sequence execution traces in order to
detect anomalies. Fu et al. [18] use a rule-based methods to identify the log keys and detect
anomalies in distributed system logs. He et al. [25] propose a guideline for log-based anomaly de-
tection by evaluating six kinds of supervised and unsupervised approaches. A log-based statistical
approach for detecting abnormal tasks and analyzing root causes from Spark logs is proposed in
our prior work [44]. Also, statistical approaches have online detection strategy, which is invoked
during the executions of applications. For example, both Spark and Hadoop provide online “spec-
ulation” [63], which is a built-in component for detecting stragglers statistically. Although it can
detect stragglers during runtime, it does not offer the root causes. In addition, the speculation is
often inaccurate, i.e., it may raise too many false alarms [32]. Chen et al. [12] propose a
tool called Pinpoint that monitors the execution and uses log traces to identify the fault modules
in J2EE applications via standard data mining approaches. A stream-based mining algorithm for
online anomalies prediction is presented by Gu et al. [21]. Ananthanarayanan et al. [6] design
a task monitoring tool called Manrti, which can cut outliers and restart tasks in real time accord-
ing to its monitoring strategy. Chen et al. [13] propose a self-adaptive tool called SAMR, which
adds weights for calculating each task duration according to historical data analysis. Aguilera et
al. [5] propose two statistical methods to discover causal paths in distributed systems by analyzing
historical log and monitoring data from the traces of applications. The most closely related work
to our approach is BigRoots [67], which detects stragglers by Spark speculation and analyzes the
root causes by extracted features. It leverages experience rule to extract features for each task from
application logs and monitoring data. However, the threshold in Spark speculation is not proper
to detect abnormal tasks. In addition, BigRoots considers only the features for each individual
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task, which can not capture the status change of the cluster, thus such a rule-based method is very
limited.
2.3.2 Classical Machine Learning Approaches
In order to avoid the ad-hoc feature extraction in statistical methods for anomaly detection from
logs, machine learning approaches have been investigated. Support Vector Machine (SVM) and
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) are common and effective supervised machine learning approaches
for anomaly detection and failure prediction. Fulp et al. [19] parse system logs by using a sliding
window and use SVM to predict anomaly. Liang et al. [41] leverage SVM, RIPPER (a rule-based
classifier), and a customized Nearest Neighbor to build up to three classifiers for failure prediction.
Lou et al. [43] apply a Bayesian learning approach on system logs to extract a constructed graph.
Although classical machine learning methods could avoid ad-hoc feature extraction with better
performance, they are more time-consuming when handling large training sets. Xu et al. [61] use
an automatic log parser to parse the source code and combine PCA to detect an anomaly, which is
based on the abstract syntax tree (AST) to analyze source code and uses machine learning to train
data. Qi et al. [51] leverage Classification and Regression Tree (CART) to analyze straggler root
causes by using Spark event logs and monitoring data (hardware metrics such as CPU status, disk
read/write rate and network send/receive rate) which collected by synchronous sampling tool.
Some machine learning approaches are also leveraged in predicting system faults using logs and
monitoring data, which are similar to the root cause analysis problem. Fulpet al. [19] leverage a
sliding window to parse system logs and predict failures using SVM. Yadwadkaret al. [62] pro-
pose an offline approach that works with resource usage data collected from the monitoring tool
Ganglia [49]. It leverages Hidden Markov Models (HMM), which is a linear machine learning
approach. Moreover, there are some off-line approaches that analyze both log files and monitoring
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data to identify abnormal events.
2.3.3 Deep Learning Approaches
Deep learning [15] approaches have achieved great success in various fields especially computer
vision. Basically, In a regular fully connected network (FC), all neurons in the current layer are in
fully connected with those in the previous layer, and back-propagation [52] is used for computing
the error gradient. Nevertheless, the FC is not suitable for calculating high-dimension datasets
such as images. To solve this problem, CNN can capture local semantic relationships instead of
global information. Log analysis also benefits from deep neural network models. As a special
recurrent neural network (RNN), Long Short Term Memory LSTM is widely used in the NLP
domain. Recently, researchers have begun to leverage LSTM to analyze logs. Brown et al. [10]
present an unsupervised LSTM and attention-based LSTM to discover hidden relationships in
system logs. Du et al. [17] propose an LSTM-based approach named DeepLog, which uses
LSTM as its training model to detect anomalies among log execution paths. In previous work [46],
we detect abnormal tasks and analyze root causes from Spark logs by using a General Regression
Neural Network (GRNN), which is a simple and fast neural network to avoid the ad-hoc weight
calculation for classifications. To Compare with our statistical approach [44], our GRNN-based
approach achieves better accuracy and offers reasonable portability results.
CNN has been widely employed in computer vision and derives many famous networks such as
AlexNet [37], GoogLeNet [57], and many others. Recently, Deep Resnet [24] is proposed for
image classification and achieves comparable results with manually labeled recognition perfor-
mance. In NLP domain, Kim et al. [35] present an effective CNN model that can directly classify
distributed embedding of words. Jason et al. [34] apply a CNN model on discrete embeddings with
good performance.
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Inspired by the human recognition system, attention mechanism is leveraged to continually im-
prove performance of DNN by focusing on relevant features. When humans try to recognize
objects, they usually first focus on partial information (relevant features), then entire events could
be recognized and processed. The attention model is first proposed in NLP to cope with tasks and
visual captioning. In the NLP area, attention-based DNN could pay attention to relevant words
or sentences instead of using whole feature sets. For example, Bahdanau et al. [7] propose soft
attention aiming at automatically capturing soft alignments between source words and target words
in machine translation.
In computer vision, attention could extract proposal regions in each picture by calculating the
weighted average of each feature. Li et al. [40] propose an end-to-end video LSTM that leverages
the soft attention for video classification. Long et al. [42] propose an attention mechanism named
Keyless Attention with better effectiveness and efficiency. In log analysis, Das et al. [14] propose
an unsupervised attention-based LSTM approach for anomaly detection on network log.
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CHAPTER 3: ABNORMAL DETECTION AND ROOT CAUSE
ANALYSIS FOR SPARK
3.1 Introduction
With rapid growth of data size and diversification of workload types, big data computing platforms
increasingly play more important roles in solving real-world problems [27, 26]. Several widely
used frameworks include Hadoop [1], Spark [2], Storm and Flink. Among them, Apache Spark
might be the popular one due to its fast and general programming model for large-scale data pro-
cessing, where Resilient Distributed Dataset (RDD) [64] are used to hold input and intermediate
data generated during the computation stages. RDDs are divided into different blocks, called par-
titions, with almost equal size among different compute nodes. Apache Spark uses pipeline to
distribute various operations that work on a single partition of RDD. In order to serialize the exe-
cution of tasks, Spark introduces stage. All tasks in the same stage execute the same operation in
parallel.
Compute nodes may suffer from severe interferences from other software (such as operating sys-
tems or other processes) or hardware, which leads to abnormal problems. For instance, a task
could become an abnormal task or straggler when encountering a significant delay in comparison
with other tasks in the same stage. In Spark, there is a mechanism named speculation to detect this
scenario, where slow tasks will be re-submitted. Spark performs speculative execution of tasks till
a specified fraction (defined by spark.speculation.quantile, which is 75% by default)
of tasks must be completed, then it checks whether or not the running tasks run slower than the me-
dian of all successfully completed tasks in a stage. A task is a straggler if its current execution time
is slower than the median by a given ratio (which is defined by speculation.multiplier,
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1.5x by default). This chapter proposes a new approach compared with Spark Speculation. In our
method, we consider whole Spark stages and abnormal tasks happening in all life span could be
detected. In addition, Spark’s report could be inaccurate because Spark uses only fixed amount of
finished task durations to speculate the unfinished tasks.
When abnormal tasks (including stragglers) happen, the performance of Spark applications could
be degraded. However, it is very difficult for users to detect and analyze the root causes. First,
Spark log files are tedious and difficult to read, and there is no straight-forward way to tell whether
abnormal tasks happen or not, even though stragglers can be reported when speculation is enabled.
Second, when an abnormal scenario happens, there is not enough information about the error
in log files so that it is difficult for users to see the concreted reasons that lead to the straggler
problem. Third, even online tools can monitor the usage and status of system resource such as
CPU, memory, disk, and network, these tools do not directly cooperate with Spark, and users still
need many efforts to scrutinize root causes based on their reporting. In addition, these monitoring
tools usually carry overhead and may slow down Spark’s performance. Abnormal tasks could be
caused by many reasons, where most of them are resource contentions [20] by CPU, memory, disk,
and network. Our motivation is to help users find the root causes of abnormal tasks by analyzing
only Spark logs.
This chapter proposes an off-line approach to detect abnormal tasks and analyze the root causes [44].
Our method is based on a statistical spatial-temporal analysis for Spark logs, which consists of
Spark execution logs and Spark garbage collection logs. There are four steps to detect the root
causes. (1) We parse Spark log files according to keywords, such as task duration, data location,
timestamp, task finish time, and generate a structured log data file. This step will eliminate all
irrelevant messages and values. (2) We extract the related feature set directly from structured log
files based on our experimental study. (3) We detect abnormal tasks from the log data by analyzing
all relevant features. Specifically, we calculate the mean and standard deviation of all tasks in each
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stage, then determine abnormal tasks for each stage. (4) We generate factor combination criteria
for each potential root cause based on analyzing their weighted factor in training datasets. Thus,
our approach can effectively determine the proper root causes for given abnormal tasks.
3.2 Methodology
Spark log does not show abnormal tasks directly, thus users cannot locate abnormal tasks by simply
searching keywords. This motivates us to design an automatic approach to help users detect the























Figure 3.1: Workflow of abnormal detection and root cause analysis.
The workflow of our approach for abnormal detection and root cause analysis is shown in Figure
4.6.
1. Log preprocessing: We collect all Spark logs, including execution logs and Spark GC logs,
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from the driver node and all worker nodes. Then, we eliminate noisy data and reformat logs
into more structured data.
2. Feature extraction: Based on Spark scheduling and potential abnormal task happening con-
ditions, we screen execution-related, memory-related, CPU-related data to generate two ma-
trices: execution log matrix and GC matrix. The details are illustrated in Section 3.2.2.
3. Abnormal detection: We implement a statistical analysis approach based on the analysis of
four kinds of features, including task duration, timestamps, GC time, and other task-related
features, to determine the degree of abnormal tasks and locate their happening. The details
are discussed in Section 3.2.3.
4. Root cause detection: Instead of qualitatively deciding the exact root causes that lead to the
abnormals, we quantitatively measure the degree of abnormals by a weighted combination
of certain specific cause-related factors. The details are sh in Section 3.2.5.
3.2.2 Feature Execution
According to Spark scheduling strategy, we define and classify all features into three categories,
namely, execution-related, memory-related, and CPU-related, which are shown in Table 4.4. For
example, the execution-related features can be extracted from Spark execution logs, including task
ID, task duration, task finished time, task started time, stage ID, and job’s duration. Spark GC log
records all JVM memory usage, from which we can extract memory-related features such as heap
usage, young space usage, as well as features related system CPU usage such as system time and













































































































Figure 3.2: Abnormal detection under CPU interference in the experiment of WordCount: (a) Ab-
normal detection result in Stage-1. (b) Abnormal detection result in Stage-2. (c) Spark execution
log features for abnormal detection in the whole execution. (d) Spark GC log features for abnormal
detection in the whole execution.
Adopting Spark speculation may bring false negatives in the process of abnormal detection. Hence,
we provide a more robust approach to locate where stragglers happen and how long they take. We
will also consider about special scenarios, for example, different stages are executed in sequence
or in parallel.
One basic justification of abnormal tasks is that the running time of abnormal tasks is relatively
longer than the normal ones. [20] uses “mean” and “median” to decide the threshold. However,
in order to seek a more reasonable anomaly detection strategy, we consider not only the mean
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or median task running time, but also the distribution of the whole data, namely the standard
deviation. In this way, we can get a macro-awareness on the task’s execution time, and then based
on the distribution of data, a more reasonable threshold can be set to differentiate abnormals from
the normal ones. The abnormal detection mainly includes the following two issues.
1. Comparing task running time on different nodes
We compare task execution time on different nodes in the same stage. Let T taski,j,k denote the
execution time of task k in stage i on node j. Let avg stagei denote the average execution time of












where J and Kj are the total number of nodes and the number of tasks in node j, respectively.
Similarly, the standard deviation of task execution in stage j of all nodes is denoted as std stagei.
Abnormal tasks are determined by the following conditions:
GBKsongtaskk

abnormal T taskk > avg stagei + k ∗ std stagei
normal otherwise
(3.2)
where k is a factor that controls the threshold for abnormal detection. In this work, we set it to 1.5
by default for fair compare with Spark provided speculator.
Figure 6.3 (c) shows abnormal detection process in Wordcount under CPU interference. Figure
6.3 (a) and (b) are two stages inside the whole application. Moreover, inside each of the stage,
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purple-dot line is the abnormal threshold determined by Eq. (3.1), and the black dot-line indicates
the threshold calculated by Spark speculation. For all tasks within a certain stage, the execution
time above that threshold are detected as abnormals; otherwise, they are normals. Figure 6.3 (d)
displays memory occupation along the execution of its corresponding working stages.
2. Locating abnormal happening
After all tasks are properly classified into “normal” and “abnormal”, the whole time line are labeled
as a vector with binary number (e.g., 0 or 1, which denote normal and abnormal, respectively). To
smooth the outliers (for example, 1 appears in many continuous 0) inside each vector, which could
be an abrupt change but not consistent abnormal base, we then empirically set a sliding window
with size of 5 to flit this vector. If the sum of numbers inside the window is larger than 2, the
number in the center of the window will be set to 1, otherwise 0.
The next step is to locate the start and end time of this abnormal task. Note that, as Spark logs
record the task finishing time but not the start time, so we locate the abnormal task’s start time
as the recorded task finishing time minus its execution time. Moreover, for abnormal detection in
each stage, the tasks are classified into two sets. One is for the initial tasks whose start time stamps
are the begin of each stage, as these tasks often have more overhead (such as loading code and Java
jar packets), and the execution time usually operates much longer than its followings. Another set
consists of the rest tasks. Our experiments show that this classification inside each stage can lead
to a much accurate abnormal threshold. In this way, our abnormal detection method can not only
detect whether abnormals happen, but also locate where and when they happen.
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Table 3.1: Extracted Spark Feature Sets
Related Name Meaning
Time stamp Event happening time
Task duration A task’s running duration time
Stage ID The ID number of each stage
Host ID The Node ID number
Executor ID The ID number of each executor running in per-worker
Task ID The unique ID number of each task
Job duration A job duration(an application has many jobs)
Stage execution time A stage running duration time
Application duration An application running duration time (after submitted)
Data require location The location of task required data
Heap space Total Heap memory usage
Before GC Young space Young space memory usage before clearing Young space
After Young GC space Young space memory usage after clearing Young space
Before Heap GC space Total Heap memory usage before GC
After Heap GC space Total Heap memory usage after GC
Full GC time Full GC execution time
GC time Minor GC execution time
GC category The time spend on one full GC operation
user time CPU time spent outside kernel execution
sys time CPU time spent insides kernel execution
real time Total elapsed time of the GC operation
3.2.4 Factors Used for Root Cause Analysis
After abnormals are located, we analyze their root causes inside that certain area. For different root
causes, we use different features in Spark log matrix and GC matrix to determine criteria to decide
the root causes. Specifically, for each root cause analysis, we use the combination of weighted
factors to define the degree of probability of each root cause. In all normal cases the factor should
equal to 1, and if an abnormal tends to any root cause, the factor will become much bigger than 1.
The factors are denoted as a,b,c,d,e,f ,g for weight calculating. All of the indexes which are used
in our factors’ definition are listed here: j,J ,i,I ,k,K,n,N , inside which, j indicates the jth node,
J is set of nodes; i is the index of stage, I is a set of stages; k denotes a task, K is a task set; n
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stands for a GC record, N is GC records set. All factors used to determine root causes are listed as
below.
1. Degree of Abnormal Ratio (DAR)
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Figure 3.3: CPU interference injected after 20s application was submitted, and continuously im-
pacts 80s









where kj indicates the number of tasks in node j, and J is the total number of nodes in the cluster.
Here, we assume that node j′ is abnormal.
2. Degree of Abnormal Duration (DAD)
The average task running time should also be considered, as the abnormal nodes often record
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3. Degree of CPU Occupation (DCO)
This factor c shown in Eq. (3.6) is used for expressing the ratio between the wall-clock time
and the real CPU time. In the normal multiple-core environment, “realTime” is often less than
“sysTime+UserTime”, because GC is usually invoked in multi-threading way. However, if the
“realTime” is bigger than “sysTime+UserTime”, it may indicate that the system is very busy. We







sysT imei,j + userT imei,j
)) (3.6)
4. Memory Changing Rate (MCR)
Eq. (3.7) indicates the gradient of GC curve. Under CPU, memory, and Disk interference, the
interfered node’s GC curve will change slower than the normal nodes’ GC curve, as shown in
Figure 3.4. k stable and k end are the gradients of the connected lines between start position
(the corresponding memory usage at abnormal starting time) to the stable memory usage position
and the start position to the abnormal memory end position (both the abnormal start and end time
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are obtained in the previous section) respectively. The reason we conduct this equation is that the
interfered node uses less memory than normal nodes under interference. In this way, we use the
maximum value of k stable in the whole cluster (k stable of normal node) to divide the minimums







(k end j′ )
(3.7)






























Figure 3.4: CPU interference is injected after WordCount has run for 30s, and continuously impacts
120s.
5. Degree of Task Delay (DTD)
For network interference, the task execution time will be affected when data transmission is de-
layed. Moreover, a Spark node often accesses data from other nodes, which leads to network
interference propagation. Based on these facts, if network interference happens inside the cluster,
the whole nodes will be affected, as shown in Figure 3.5, which is the location of our detected
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interference. Let a be a factor that describes the degree of interference.




Where abn probj indicates the ratio of abnormal that we detect for each node j inside that area.
The reason that we use the product of abnormal ratio other than the sum of them is that only
when all nodes are with a portion of abnormal should we identify them with a potential of network
interference, or if sum is used, we cannot detect this joint probability. Meanwhile, the exponential
is to make sure that the final factor e is no less than 1. In this way, the phenomenon of error




Figure 3.5: Network interference is injected after WordCount has been executed for 30s, and
continuously impacts for 160s.
6. Degree of Memory Changing (DMC)
As network bandwidth is limited or the network speed slows down, when one node get affected by
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that interference, the task will wait for their data transformation from other nodes. Hence, CPU
















where mj,n indicates the gradient of memory changing in nth task on node j. Eq. (3.9) is to find
the longest horizontal line that presents the conditions under which tasks’ progress become tardy (,
CPU is relatively idle and memory is kept the same). We first calculate the max value of gradient
for each GC point, denoted as m. To identify the longest horizontal line in each node, we make
a trade-off between its gradient and the corresponding horizontal length. To determine a relative
value that presents the degree of abnormal out of normal, we finally compare the max and min
among nodes with their max “horizontal factor” (e−|mj,n| ∗ (xj,n − xj,n)), where e is to ensure that
the whole factor of b not less than 1).



























Figure 3.6: Network interference is injected after WordCount has been executed for 30s, and
continuously impacts for 120s.
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7. Degree of Loading Delay (DLD)
Considering that the initial task at the beginning of each stage always have a higher overhead to
load data blocks compared to the rest tasks. As shown in Figure 3.7. To only focus on that area,
the factor of g is proposed to measure its abnormality. Similar to factor f , instead of taking all the
tasks inside the detected stage into consideration, here, the first task of each node is used to replace
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Figure 3.7: Disk interference is injected after WordCount has run for 20s, and continuously impacts
80s
3.2.5 Root Cause Analysis
As shown in Table 4.2, each root cause is determined by a combination of factors with specific
weights.
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The nodes with CPU interference often have a relatively lower computation capacity, which leads
to less tasks allocated and longer execution time for tasks on it. Factors a and b are used to test if
the interference is CPU or not, because CPU interference can reduce the number of scheduled tasks
and increase the abnormal tasks’ execution time. Factor c indicates the degree of CPU occupation,
and CPU interference will slow down of the performance compared to normal cases. Factor d is
used to measure memory changing rate, because CPU interference may lead memory change to
become slowly than other regular nodes.
For the network-related interferences, because of its propagation, the original interfered node will
often recover earlier. So our approach is to detect the first recovered node as the initial network-
interfered node, and the degree b quantitatively describes the interference. When network interfer-
ence occurs, tasks are usually waiting for data delivery (factor e), the memory monitored by GC
log f is usually unchanged.
For the memory-related interferences, when memory interference is injected into the cluster, we
can even detect a relatively lower CPU usage than other normal nodes. Considering this, the task
numbers (factor a) and task duration (factor b) are also added to determine such root causes with
certain weights. Moreover, the memory interference will impact memory usage, and the factor d
should be considered for this root cause detection.
To determine disk interferences, we introduce the factor g to measure the degree of disk inter-
ference. The task set scheduled at the beginning of each stage could be affected by disk I/O.
Therefore, these initial tasks on disk I/O interfered nodes behave differently from other nodes’
initial tasks beginning tasks (factor g), CPU will become busy, and memory usage is different with
other nodes’. Therefore, The memory changing rate (factor c) and CPU Occupation (factor d) are
also used to determine such root causes.
After deciding the combination of factors for each root cause, we give them weights to determine
30
root causes accurately as Eq. (3.11) shows. Here, all weights are between 0 and 1, and the sum
of them for each root cause is 1. To decide the values of weights, we use classical liner regression
on training sets that we obtained from experiments on WordCount, Kmeans, and PageRank, which
are discussed in more details in Section 4.5.
CPU = 0.3 ∗ a+ 0.3 ∗ b+ 0.2 ∗ c+ 0.2 ∗ d
Memory = 0.25 ∗ a+ 0.25 ∗ b+ 0.5 ∗ d
Network = 0.1 ∗ b+ 0.4 ∗ e+ 0.5 ∗ f
Disk = 0.2 ∗ c+ 0.2 ∗ d+ 0.6 ∗ g
(3.11)
Then, Eq. (3.12) is proposed to calculate the final probability that the abnormal belongs to each of
the root causes.
probability = 1− 1
factor
(3.12)
Table 3.2: Factor for each root causes

















In this section, we present the experimental results on our abnormal detection and the root cause
analysis in three Spark applications, e.g., WordCount, Kmeans, and PageRank which are provided
by sparkbench [38].
3.3.1 Experimental Setup
To evaluate the performance of our proposed approach, we build an Apache Spark Standalone
Cluster with four compute nodes, in which each compute node has a hardware configuration with
Intel Xeon CPU E5-2620 v3 @ 2.40GHz, 16GB main memory, 1 Gbps Ethernet, and CentOS 6.6
with kernel 2.6. Apache Spark is v2.0.2.
3.3.2 Interference Injection
1. CPU: We spawn a bunch of processes to compete with Apache Spark jobs for computing
resources, which triggers straggler problems in consequence of limited CPU resource.
2. Memory: We run a program that requests a significant amount of memory to compete with
Apache Spark jobs. Thus, Garbage Collection will be frequently invoked to reclaim free
space.
3. Disk: We simulate disk I/O contention using “dd” command to conduct massive disk I/O
operations to compete with Apache Spark jobs.
4. Network: We simulate a scenario where network latency has a great impact on Spark. Specif-
ically, we use “tc” command to limit bandwidth between two computing nodes.
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3.3.3 Experimental Result Analysis & Evaluation
Table 3.3: Root causes diagnosis result
Benchmark Interference CPU Memory Network Disk
Wordcount
CPU 86.5 35.0 20.0 60.0
Memory 61.2 62.6 20.4 36.0
Network 51.5 32.5 85.0 32.4
Disk 60.2 40.5 26.2 82.5
Normal 8.5 3.5 5.2 10.3
Kmeans
CPU 86.0 53.1 24.5 42.3
Memory 60.5 53.5 35.6 30.5
Network 43.5 35.2 87.2 42.5
Disk 76.5 53.2 46.2 82.3
Normal 8.6 2.3 3.6 9.6
PageRank
CPU 83.2 43.3 24.3 52.5
Memory 65.4 67.6 26.5 45.0
Network 53.5 46.8 85.8 51.0
Disk 60.3 53.6 25.5 75.6
Normal 9.1 4.5 3.6 10.2
We conduct experiments on three benchmarks, WordCount in Spark package, Kmeans and Page
Rank in SparkBench [38]. We run each of the benchmarks 20 times with simulated interference
injection.
Table 3.3 summarizes the probability results of our root cause detection approach. For the first
step, totally 320 abnormal cases are created, out of which 38 are detected as normal (accuracy:
88.125%). Among these mis-classified cases, 29 are from memory fault injection and the rest 9
are from disk IO. Meanwhile, additional 60 normal cases are also put into our approach for root
cause detection, and no one is reported as abnormal. We also check the normal cases’ abnormal
factors to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. In all three benchmarks, the impact of
CPU interference is significant, and tasks under CPU interference can be detected as abnormal
with high probability. For memory interference, its probability is not significant because memory
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interference has less direct effect on Spark tasks, not like root causes. Injecting significant memory
interference into one node will cause the whole application crash because the executers of Spark
will fail if without enough memory. For network interference, the results show that the proposed
approach gives a high probability. Lastly, disk interference shows a high probability in disk root
causes. Worth mentioning here, for all different root causes, the detected probability of CPU are
always high, because all root causes will eventually affect the efficiency of CPU.
3.3.4 Discussion
Our approach is only tested on clusters with injecting interference on a single node. In order to
show considerable effect, the interference will last a while. Additionally, as our approach is based
on the task analysis inside each stage, it requires the target application with a certain amount of
task partitions for each stage. Furthermore, our approach would be less suitable for analyzing
user’s log with different Garbage Collectors such as G1, CMS, and the new version of Spark log
with different Spark schedulers.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a novel statistical-based approach for Spark log analysis, and it identifies
abnormal tasks by combining both Spark log and Spark GC log, and then analyze the root causes
by weighted factors without using additional system monitoring information. Different with other
Spark related methods, our approach is a pure off-line method and only leverage Spark log to
analyze abnormal tasks. Furthermore, we prefer using probabilistic output to determine the degree
and category of abnormality, rather than considering the problem of classifications of positive and
negative samples that CART did. Our approach achieves a reasonable probabilistic results than the
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speculated straggler detection in Spark. Moreover, our approach can also identify the root causes
of abnormal tasks with probability. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed approach
can accurately locate abnormals and find their root causes in different applications.
35
CHAPTER 4: GRNN-BASED NEURAL NETWORK APPROACH
4.1 Introduction
This chapter extends our previous work [44], which presents a statistical rule-based approach for
log analysis and offers a reasonable result to explain its root causes probabilities [46]. However,
it can not give a satisfying result with higher precision for its classifying. Since the relationship
between factors is not simply linearly correlated, and we also changed old factor MCR to a new fac-
tor MCS with AUC calculation instead of gradients calculation and add it to our factor sets. From
this point, a GRNN-based approach is proposed for root cause analysis to consider non-linearly
correlated relationship of new factor set, and avoid human ad-hoc choosing and classification.
In this chapter, we leverage General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) to identify root causes
for abnormal tasks. The likelihoods of reported root causes are presented to users according to the
weighted factors by GRNN. We named our detection tool as LADRA, which means Log-based
Abnormal Detection and Root causes analysis. LADRA is an off-line tool that can accurately
analyze abnormality without extra monitoring overhead. Four potential root causes, e.g., CPU,
memory, network, and disk I/O, are considered. We have tested LADRA atop of three Spark
benchmarks by injecting some aforementioned root causes. Experimental results show that our
proposed approach is more accurate in the root cause analysis than other existing methods.
GRNN is a simple and efficient network with fast computing speed, because GRNN’s transfer
function (pattern layer) is a kind of Gaussian function, and it could achieve local approximation
with fast speed without any backpropagation training operations. Due to the fact that classical
neural networks, especially deep neural networks, require much more effort to tune hyperparame-
ters, which has been proved to be not proper to fit small datasets, just like our Spark log. Hence,
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we choose GRNN in our design. Thanks to its flexible structure, which can automatically set the
number of nerve cells in the pattern layer.
In brief, the BP (Back Propagation) based deep learning algorithms may be vulnerable to the
over-fitting problem especially when the dataset is small, which is just the characteristic of our
dataset. Traditional data fitting algorithms usually assume that the data obey a certain distribution
in advance, which can drastically affect the final result. As a non-parameter neural network model
for data fitting, with its high efficiency and accuracy, GRNN is fully capable of dealing with our
current problem. In addition, the experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of GRNN
compared with other attempts we have tried.
As a non-parameter neural network model for data fitting, with its high efficiency and accuracy,
GRNN is fully capable of dealing with our current problem. In addition, the experimental results
demonstrate the effectiveness of GRNN compared with other attempts we have tried. A represen-
tation of the GRNN architecture for our implementation of root cause identification is shown in
Figure 4.6. Our model consists of four layers: input layer, pattern layer, summation layer, and out-
put layer. According to our data structure, the input layer consists of 7 neurons, which indicates the
dimension of our extracted input feature vector (xa, xb... xg). The pattern layer is a fully connected
layer, which consists of neurons with the same size as input data, and followed by the summation
layer. At the end, the output layer of GRNN gives a prediction result on the probability for each
root cause. We use softmax function to convert the output into a normalized one for more intuitive
comparison.
This chapter proposes a new neural network-based model to automatically calculate the probability
of each root cause. We use a one-pass training neural network, GRNN, to create a smooth transition
and more accurate results.
Although Spark logs are informative, they lack direct information about the root cause of ab-
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normal tasks. Thus, simple keyword-based log search is ineffective for diagnosing the abnormal
tasks, which motivates us to design an automatic approach to help users detect abnormal tasks
and analyze their root causes. An overview of our tool is depicted in Figure 4.1, which contains
five primary components: log preprocessing, feature extraction, abnormal task detection, factor
extraction, and root cause analysis.
1. Log preprocessing: Spark log contains a large amount of information. In order to extract
useful information for analysis, we first collect all Spark logs, including execution logs and
JVM GC logs, from the driver node and all worker nodes. Then, we use a parser to eliminate
noisy and trivial logs, and convert them into structured data.
2. Feature extraction: Based on the Spark scheduling and abnormal task occurring conditions,
we quantify the data locality feature with a binary number format. Then, we screen struc-
tured logs and select three kinds of feature datasets: execution-related, memory-related, and
system-related. Finally, we store them into two numerical matrices: execution log matrix
and GC matrix.
3. Abnormal detection: We implement a statistical abnormal detection algorithm to detect
where and when the abnormal tasks happen based on the analysis of execution-related feature
sets. This detection method determines the threshold by calculating the standard deviation
of task duration and uses it to detect abnormal tasks in each stage from Spark logs, which is
introduced in Section 4.2.
4. Abnormal factor extraction: According to our empirical case study, we combine special
features to synthesize two kinds of factors, the speed factor and the degree factor, which
describe the status of each node in the whole cluster. Section 4.3 introduced these factors
used by our root cause analysis method.
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5. Root cause analysis: We propose a General Regression Neural Network (GRNN) based
approach for our root-cause analysis, in which probability results can be calculated more
accurately than our previous statistical work. Our experiments show that the GRNN-based
approach has more accurate results than existing approaches, which are introduced in detail
in Section 4.4.
















































Figure 4.1: The workflow of LADRA
4.2 Log Feature Extraction and Abnormal Task detection
4.2.1 Log Feature Extraction
When an abnormal task happens, it usually does not cast any warnings or error messages. As Spark
does not directly reveal any information about abnormal tasks, it is a very challenging problem to
detect these problems. Our approach starts from understanding the Spark scheduling strategy, then
extracts features associated with CPU, memory, network, and disk I/O to build a feature matrix,
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which reflects the whole cluster’s status. These features can be classified into three categories:
execution-related, memory-related, and system-related, as shown in Table 4.4.
The execution-related features are extracted from Spark execution logs, including (1) the ID num-
ber of each task, stage, executor, job, and host, (2) the duration of each task, stage, and job, (3) the
whole application execution time, (4) the timestamp for each event, and (5) data locality. Spark
GC logs represent JVM memory usage of each executor in workers, from which we can extract
memory-related features such as heap usage, young space usage before GC, young space usage
after GC. In addition, system related features can be also extracted from GC logs, such as real
time, system time, and user time.
Table 4.1: Extracted features for abnormal task detection
Feature Category Feature Name
Execution related Task ID Job ID Task duration
Stage ID Job duration Data locality
Host ID Stage duration Timestamp
Executor ID Application exe-
cution time
GC time After young GC After Heap GC
Memory related Full GC time Before young GC Before Heap GC
Heap space GC category
System related Real time CPU time User time
4.3 Factor Extraction
To look for the root causes of abnormal tasks, we introduce abnormal factors, which are the synthe-
sis of features based on the empirical study on the 22 features in Spark log matrix and GC matrix.
Those factors are normalized features that present status change of the whole cluster, not only for
assessing individual components, such as task and stage, but also a series of abnormal tasks, which
may be generated by continuous interference affecting the cluster.
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In normal cases, each factor should be close to 1; otherwise, it implies an abnormal case. In our
factors’ definition, j denotes the jth node, J presents a set of nodes; i indicates the index of stage,
I is a set of stages; k denotes a task, K is a task set; n stands for a GC record, N is a GC record
set. All factors used to determine root causes are listed as below.
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Figure 4.2: Task duration variation in CPU interference injected after Sorting application has been
submitted for 60s, and continuously impacts for 120s.
Degree of Abnormal Ratio (DAR) describes the degree of imbalanced scheduling of victim nodes,
due to the fact that the victim nodes will be scheduled with fewer tasks than other normal nodes.
For example, as shown in Figure 4.2, CPU interference can cause fewer tasks (red dots) to be
scheduled at a victim node (node1) than normal nodes. Eq. (4.1) illustrates the degree of abnormal
ratio in a certain stage. Therefore, the factor DAR implies that the number of tasks in intra-node









where kj denotes the number of tasks on node j, and J is the total number of nodes in the cluster.
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Here, we assume that node j′ is abnormal.
Degree of Abnormal Duration (DAD) is used to measure the average task duration, as the abnor-

















Degree of CPU Occupation (DCO) describes the degree of CPU occupation by calculating the
ratio between the wall-clock time and the real CPU time. In the normal multiple-core environment,
“realTime” is often less than “sysTime+userTime”, because GC is usually invoked in a multi-
threading way. However, if the “realTime” is bigger than “sysTime+userTime”, it may indicate
that the system is quite busy due to CPU or disk I/O contentions. We choose a max value across





sysT imei,j + userT imei,j
)) (4.4)
Memory Change Speed (MCS) indicates the speed of memory usage change according to GC
curve. Due to the fact that under CPU, memory, and disk I/O interference, the victim node’s GC
curve will vary slower than the normal nodes’ GC curve, as shown in Figure 4.3. starta and
stablea are the points of the start position (the corresponding memory usage at abnormal starting
time) and the stable memory usage position, respectively. startb and stablea are the start and
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end positions of abnormal memory, respectively, which are obtained by analyzing logs introduced
before. The intuition is that the interfered node gradually uses less memory than normal nodes
under interference, as shown in Figure 4.3. Hence, we use the area under GC curve a in the whole
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Figure 4.3: Memory usage variation in CPU interference injected after WordCount application has
been submitted for 20s, and continuously impacts for 120s.
Abnormal Recovery Speed (ARS) measures the speed of abnormal task’s recovery. Since one
Spark node often accesses data from other nodes, it can leads to network interference propagation.
It is both inter-node and intra-node problem. We can detect network interference happening inside
cluster, as shown in Figure 4.4, which is the location of our detected interference and shows that
task duration will be affected by delayed data transmission. We leverage Eq. (4.6) to calculate
this factor, where abn probj indicates the ratio of the abnormals that we detect for each node j
inside that area. The reason that we use the product of abnormal ratio other than the sum of them
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is that only when all nodes are with a portion of abnormal, we identify them with a potential of
network interference; if their sum is used, we cannot detect this joint probability. Meanwhile,
the exponential is to make sure this factor is no less than 1. Hence, the phenomenon of error
propagation will be detected and quantified by calculating this factor.
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Figure 4.4: Task duration variation in Network interference injected after WordCount has been
executed for 100s, and continuously impacts for 160s.
Degree of Memory Change (DMC) describes how much of memory usage changed during the
execution in each node. In fact, when network bandwidth is limited, or the network speed slows
down, the victim node gets affected by that interference, and tasks will wait for their data transfor-
mation from other nodes. Hence, the tasks will pause or work very slowly, and data transfer rate
becomes low, as shown in Figure 4.5. We leverage Eq. (4.7) to find the longest horizontal line that
presents the conditions under which tasks’ progress become tardy (e.g., CPU is relatively idle
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and memory remains the same). In Eq. (4.7), mj,n indicates the gradient of memory changing in
the nth task on node j. First, the max value of gradient is calculated for each GC point, denoted as
m. Second, we make a trade-off between its gradient and the corresponding horizontal length to
identify the longest horizontal line in each node. Then, to determine a relative value that presents
the degree of abnormal out of normal, we finally compare the max and min among nodes with
their max “horizontal factor” (e−|mj,n| ∗ (xj,n − xj,n−1)), where e is to ensure that the whole factor















Degree of Loading Delay (DLD) measures how much difference of loading duration on cluster
nodes. Note that the initial task at the beginning of each stage always has a higher overhead to
load data compared with the rest tasks. Similar to the factor DMC, instead of taking all tasks
inside the detected stage into consideration, here, the first task of each node is used to replace the
“avg nodej”.
Instead of taking all the tasks inside the detected stage into consideration, here, the first task of







where, j′ /∈ J (4.8)
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Figure 4.5: Memory usage variation in Network interference injected after Wordcount has been
executed for 30s, and continuously impacts for 160s.
4.4 Root Cause Analysis
The statistical rule based approach offers a reasonable result to explain its root causes probabil-
ities. However it can not give a satisfied result with higher precision for its classifying. Since
the relationship between factors is not simply linearly correlated, and we also changed old factor
MCR to a new factor MCS with AUC calculation instead of gradients calculation and add it to
our factor sets. From this point, a GRNN-based approach is proposed for root cause analysis to




We propose a new neural network based model to automatically calculate the probability of each
root cause. We use a one-pass training neural network, GRNN, to create a smooth transition and
more accurate results.
GRNN is a simple and efficient network with fast computing speed, because GRNNs transfer func-
tion (pattern layer) is a kind of Gaussian function, and it could achieve local approximation with
fast speed without any back propagation training operations. As due to the fact that classical neural
networks, especially deep neural networks, require much more efforts to tune hyper-parameters,
which has been proved to be not proper to fit small datasets, just like our Spark log. Hence, we
choose GRNN in our design. Thanks to its flexible structure, which can automatically set the
number of nerve cells in the pattern layer. In brief, the BP (Back Propagation) based deep learn-
ing algorithms may be vulnerable to the over-fitting problem especially when the dataset is small,
which is just the characteristic of our dataset. Traditional data fitting algorithms usually assumes
that the data obey a certain distribution in advance, which can drastically affect the final result.
As a non-parameter neural network model for data fitting, with its high efficiency and accuracy,
GRNN is fully capable of dealing with our current problem. In addition, the experimental results
demonstrate the effectiveness of GRNN compared with other attempts we have tried.
As a non-parameter neural network model for data fitting, with its high efficiency and accuracy,
GRNN is fully capable of dealing with our current problem. In addition, the experimental results
demonstrate the effectiveness of GRNN compared with other attempts we have tried. A represen-
tation of the GRNN architecture for our implementation of root cause identification is shown in
Figure 4.6. Our model consists of four layers: input layer, pattern layer, summation layer, and out-
put layer. According to our data structure, the input layer consists of 7 neurons, which indicates the
dimension of our extracted input feature vector (xa,xb...xg). The pattern layer is a fully connected
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layer, which consists of neurons with the same size as input data, and followed by the summation
layer. At the end, the output layer of GRNN gives a prediction result on the probability for each
root cause. We use softmax function to convert the output into a normalized one for more intuitive
comparison.
The transfer function Fi in pattern layer is defined in (4.9), X denotes the input data, σ represents
as a smooth parameter, which is set to 0.5 according to our experimental attempts. The hyper-
parameter of σ is used to control the smoothness of the model. When the value is relatively
large, it is equivalent to increasing the variance in the Gaussian density distribution, which makes
the transition between different categories smoother. While the problem is that the classification
boundary will be blurred. Conversely, when a smaller value is assigned to this hyper-parameter,
the ability to fit real data of the model will be stronger but the generalization turns out to be
relatively weak. In the following, summation layer is added, which contains two kinds of neurons:
S-summation neuron (S) and D-summation neuron (SD), as defined in (4.10), respectively. SD
neurons are used to calculate the arithmetic summation of pattern layer’s output. The remaining S
neurons weight summation for the output of pattern layer. The i denotes ith number of input data,
j denotes the jth dimension of output, and Sj denotes the jth S neuron output. Then, the w denotes
weight in hidden layer. The label (output layer) here is a 5-dimension one-hot vector with one
indicating normal log and the rest four are injections. y indicates yj indicates the jth output item
the output as defined in (4.11). Due to probability representation of root cause, after the output
layer of GRNN, we add a softmax layer to convert the sum of 5-dimensional output to be 1.
Fi = exp (
−(X−Xi)T(X−Xi)
2σ2






i=1(Fi), where i = 1 : n
Sj =
∑n
i=1(wijFi), where j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
(4.10)




,where j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (4.11)
To sum up, GRNN can select a dominant weight for each of our factors, and provide the root cause





































Figure 4.6: The architecture of our GRNN-based model for root-cause analysis.
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4.5 Experiments
We evaluate LADRA on four widely used benchmarks and focus on the following two questions:
(1) Can the abnormal tasks be detected? (2) What accuracy can LADRA’s root cause analysis
achieve? In the experiment, we conduct a series of interference injections to simulate various
scenarios that lead to abnormal tasks.
4.5.1 Setup
Table 4.2: Related factors for each root cause















Table 4.3: Benchmark resource intensity









Clusters: We set up an Apache Spark standalone cluster with one master node (labeled by m1) and
six slave nodes (labeled by n1,n2,n3,n4,n5,n6) based on Amazon EC2 cloud resource. Each node
is configured with type of “r3.xlarge” (24 virtual cores and 30GB of memory) and Ubuntu 16.04.9.
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We conduct a bunch of experiments atop of Apache Spark 2.2.0 with JDK 1.8.0, Scala-2.11.11,
and Hadoop-2.7.4 packages. Given that an AWS instance is configured with EBS by default, it is
difficult for us to inject disk I/O interference. Hence, we set up a 90G ephemeral disk for each
instance and deploy a HDFS to store data.
Workload: In fact, some Spark applications may consume resources more intensively. According
to previous studies on Spark performance [54], we choose four benchmarks built on Hibench [28]
and one real-world CPS application in our experiments: WordCount, Sorting, PageRank, K-means,
which cover the domain of statistical batch application, machine learning program, and iterative
application. WordCount and Sorting are one-pass programs, K-means and PageRank are itera-
tive programs. We characterize the benchmarks by resource intensive type and program type for
underpinning our approach’s scalability. The resource intensity of each benchmark is shown in
Table 4.3. The characteristics of four benchmarks are listed as follows.
• WordCount is a one-pass program for counting how many times a word appears. We lever-
age RandomTextWriter in Hibench to generate 80G datasets as our workload and store it
in HDFS. It is CPU-bound and disk-bound during map stage, then network-bound during
reduce stage.
• Sorting is also a one-pass program that encounters heavy shuffle. The input data is generated
by RandomTextWriter in Hibench. Sorting is disk-bound in sampling stage and CPU-bound
in map stage, and its reduce stage is network-bound.
• K-means is an iterative clustering machine learning algorithm.The workload is generated by
the k-means generator in Hibench, and is composed of 80 million points and 12 columns
(dimensions). It is CPU-bound and network-bound during map stage.
• PageRank is an iterative ranking algorithm for graph computing. In order to analyze root
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causes of abnormal tasks with PageRank, we use Hibench PageRank as the testing workload,
and generate eighty thousand vertices by Hibench’s generator as input datasets. It is CPU-
bound in each iteration’s map stage, and network bound in each reduce stage.
A CPS K-means is a real-world CPS application in civil engineering that we developed
before. The workload data size is 18 GB and collected by sensors installed at a classroom
building. Those sensors measure real time temperature and humidity from each classroom.
The collected data set is leveraged for detecting outlier temperature and humidity. To solve
this real-world problem with effective approaches, we implemented a K-means algorithm on
Spark for pre-clustering and grouping sensor data into sub-clusters and decide the outliers.
4.5.2 LADRA Interference Framework
In order to induce abnormal tasks in the real execution for experiment, we design an interference
framework that can inject four major resource (CPU, memory, disk I/O, and network) interference
to mimic various abnormal scenarios. In order to simplify experiment, we apply all interference
injection techniques only on node n1 for all test cases. In addition, for each injection, it will be
launched during a time interval of 10 seconds and 60 seconds after the first spark job is initiated,
and continue for 120 seconds to 300 seconds. Finally, when a test case is over, we recover all
involved computing nodes to normal state by terminating all interference injections. Specifically,
the following interference injections are used in our experiments:
• CPU interference: CPU Hog is simulated via spawning a bunch of processes at the same time
to compete with Apache Spark processes. This injection causes CPU resource contention in
consequence of limited CPU resource.
52
• Memory interference: Memory resource scarcity is simulated via running a program that
requests a significant amount of memory in a certain time to compete with Apache Spark
jobs, then we hold on this certain of memory space for a while. Thus, Garbage Collection
will be frequently invoked to reclaim free space.
• Disk interference: Disk Hog (contention) is simulated via leveraging “dd” command to
continuously read data and write them back to the ephemeral disk to compete with Apache
Spark jobs. It impacts both write and read speed. After the interference is done, we clear the
generated files and system cache space.
• Network interference: Network scenario is simulated when network latency has a great im-
pact on Spark. Specifically, we use “tc” command to limit bandwidth between two comput-
ing nodes with specific duration. In this way, the data transmission rate will be slowed down
for a while.




Task ID Job ID Task duration
Stage ID Job duration Data locality
Execution
related
Host ID Stage duration Timestamp
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System related Real time CPU time User time
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4.5.3 Abnormal Task Detection
Table 4.5: LADRA’s abnormal task detection compares with Spark speculation’s approach in four
intensive benchmarks, where TPR = True Positive Rate, FPR = False Positive Rate.
LADRA Spark speculation
TPR FPR TPR FPR
WordCount 0.96 0.06 0.94 0.8
Sorting 0.96 0.16 0.96 0.7
K-Means 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.7
CPS K-Means 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.7
PageRank 0.6 0.517 0.9 0.48


































Figure 4.7: Abnormal task detection for K-means without interference injection.
To evaluate LARDA, we compare LADRA’s detection with the Spark speculation. Each bench-
mark is executed 50 times without any interference injection, and 50 times under the circumstances
of abnormal tasks. After that, we calculate the True Positive Rate (TPR) and False Positive Rate
(FPR) results by counting the correct rate of each job classification as shown in Eq. (4.12) and
Eq. (4.13). The comparison result is shown in Table 4.5.
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As a build-in straggler detector, Spark speculation brings False Positive (FP) and True Negative
(TN) problems in abnormal task detection. We compare LADRA with Spark speculation in details.
For instance, Figure 4.7 shows one stage in a normal K-means execution, x-axis and y-axis present
stage duration and task duration, respectively, and no abnormal tasks are detected by LADRA
(purple higher horizontal dash dotted line). However, Spark speculation (black lower horizontal
dash dotted line) detects stragglers (area above the speculation line and beside red dotted vertical
line) after 75% tasks (red dotted vertical line) finish. In this way, Spark speculation may delay the
normal execution, as it will reschedule the stragglers to other executors. Moreover, Spark specu-
lation will cause true negative problems as shown in Figure 4.2, because it only checks the 25%
slowest tasks. As shown in Table 4.5, LADRA has a better accuracy in abnormal task detection
than Spark speculation for all benchmarks. However, LADRA has lower accuracy on K-Means
and PageRank than WordCount and Sorting. We find that under normal execution, most tasks in
the map stage or sampling stage of K-Means and PageRank have an unexpected longer duration,
because these benchmarks have many iteration stages, and tasks in those stages have data skew
and cross-rack traffic fetching problems. LADRA cannot detect data skew problem within normal











Table 4.6: Root cause analysis result of LADRA’s GRNN approach, TPR = True Positive Rate, P
= Precision
WordCount Sorting K-Means CPS K-Means PageRank
TPR P TPR P TPR P TPR P TPR P
CPU 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.940 0.857 0.835 0.866 0.837 0.951 0.826
Disk I/O 0.450 0.420 0.679 0.894 0.423 0.692 0.533 0.666 0.540 0.847
Network 1.000 0.955 1.000 0.853 0.679 0.730 0.700 0.750 0.688 0.564
Normal 0.919 0.837 0.965 0.924 0.733 0.686 0.732 0.632 0.602 0.640
4.5.4 LADRA’s Root Cause Analysis Result
To test the accuracy of LADRA’s GRNN approach for root cause analysis, we use cross validation
strategy with 1/3 for test data and 2/3 for train data each time. Data in normal cases is also used in
our training for improving the accuracy. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach,
we run the GRNN 100 times and get the final accuracy result. We calculate the Precision (P) and
True Positive Rate (TPR) for each detected root cause type by Eq. (5.4) and Eq. (4.12).
P =
TP
(TP + FP )
(4.14)
We abandon memory root cause analysis in our experiments for three reasons. First, injecting
significant memory interference into one node may cause the whole application to crash, as ex-
ecutors of Spark will fail if without enough memory. For instance, injected memory interference
in PageRank benchmark not only causes Out-of-Memory (OOM) failures, but also makes execu-
tor keep quitting (executors are continuously restarted and fail). Secondly, memory interference
does not work for non memory-intensive benchmarks. For instance, WordCount is not a memory-
intensive program, and it will not evoke abnormal tasks, even injecting significant memory in-
terference. Thirdly, memory interference could also consume CPU resources, and may mislead
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GRNN’s classifying.
Table 4.6 summarizes the total P and TPR results of LADRA’s root cause analysis for four bench-
marks. There are two issues to be noted. (1) LADRA has the highest CPU analysis precision
(1.000 in CPU root cause analysis for WordCount) and higher network analysis precision (0.9545
in network root cause analysis for WordCount) results than disk I/O (0.4200 in disk I/O root cause
analysis for WordCount) for three reasons. First, all four benchmarks are CPU-intensive, and
require large CPU resource for computing (map and sampling stages), and network resource to
transfer data (reduce stages). Secondly, abnormal tasks have longer duration after CPU interfer-
ence is injected, and the impact of network injection is significant (CPU stays idle). Thus, the
synthesized factors demonstrate their effectiveness. Thirdly, as disk hog is injected by leveraging
a bunch of processes to read and write disk, it consumes not only disk I/O but also a certain of
CPU resources. Therefore, disk I/O injections may be wrongly classified into other root causes
(, CPU, network, or normal). (2) As shown by Table 4.6, LADRA is more precise on one-pass
benchmarks than iterative benchmarks, such as K-means and PageRank. The TPR of k-means and
PageRank’s disk I/O is lower than the other two benchmarks. It is because that PageRank and k-
means are not disk I/O-intensive benchmarks, if the intermediate data is small enough to be caught
in memory, it will not use disk space. Therefore, the disk interference does not impact too much for
these benchmarks that have small size intermediate data. Moreover, wrong classification of other
root causes in k-means and PageRank also impacts LADRA’s normal root cause classification, it
causes more FP problems, or less TP. So the normal cases in k-means and PageRank also have
lower precision and TPR. To compare with the same approach with different data size in different
domains, two K-means experiments are performed on our LADRA. One uses a generated dataset
by Hibench [28], and the other one uses the dataset produced by a real-world CPS application.
We keep all the hyper-parameter setting to be identical. Theoretically, due to the workload data
distribution is different, the Spark platform will give a weakly different but similar result since data
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itself is not a critical role, as shown in our experiment.
To sum up, LADRA can analyze root causes via Spark log with high precision and TPR for one-
pass applications. However, there may be a few of limitations for LADRA to analyze root causes by
only using Spark logs. Although Spark logs contain full information, but not so rich as monitoring
data.
It might be not possible to analyze all kinds of root causes by only leveraging log files. Some
root causes such as code failures, resource usages, and network failures, may rely on monitoring
tools. LADRA’s goal is to mine useful information and leverage limited log information to analyze
resource root causes without extra overhead.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter presents LADRA, an off-line log-based root cause analysis tool to accurately detect
abnormal tasks for big data platforms. LADRA can identify abnormal tasks by analyzing ex-
tracted features from Spark logs, which is more accurate than Spark’s speculation-based straggler
detection method. In addition, LADRA is capable of analyzing the root causes precisely using
a GRNN-based method without additional monitoring. The experimental results using realistic
benchmarks demonstrate that the proposed approach can accurately locate abnormalities and re-
port their root causes. According to our experiment results, we can effectively detect the resource
abnormal and analyze root causes in Spark applications.
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CHAPTER 5: CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORK FOR
DETECTING ANOMALIES
5.1 Introduction
A log entry (log line) is considered anomaly if it contains abnormal key words (“error”, “warning”)
or shows significant unexpected order in context, for example, a Spark executor restarts repeatedly
before it stops working. Classical anomaly detection has been studied for many years. Various
algorithms and methods have been developed, such as basic key word searching, regulation expres-
sion matching, traditional statistical and machine learning approaches. It may incorrectly identify
the anomalies and report false positives when searching anomalies with key words, or matching
with regular expression.
Hence, some techniques such as Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Principal Component Anal-
ysis (PCA) [60] are often used to reduce the complexity of feature set to be analyzed and improve
accuracy. However, the hidden relationships in extracted feature set are still very difficult to be an-
alyzed by these aforementioned approaches, which often require more sophisticated approaches.
In recent years, deep learning approaches are leveraged in the log analysis domain to improve au-
tomation and accuracy. For instance, Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) and Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN) are used by [10, 17] to detect anomalies with a high accuracy to avoid ad-hoc fea-
ture extraction. Within all deep learning methods, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) could
be the most famous and widely used approach, which has obtained great achievements in computer
vision. Due to the convolution layers, CNN-based approach can learn the hidden relationships with
higher accuracy than other deep learning methods.
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This chapter proposes a Convolutional Neural Networks [45] approach for anomaly detection from
HDFS logs.
5.2 Methodology
In this section, we present our two-fold method. We first introduce our log processing, and then
detail our CNN-based approach and MLP-based approach as the baseline.
5.2.1 Log Processing
The purpose of our log processing is to generate structural input for our CNN model. As the system
log consists of multiple identifiers (defined by [61]), an identifier is an object and has a certain exe-
cution path. For example, block ID is an identifier token in HDFS log, and block a is an actual
identifier and the execution path of block a is a sequence that consists of three related log keys
(e.g., Receiving block, PacketResponder for block terminating, Deleting
block file). Initially, a log template parser is used to find the frequent log constants, named
log key. Then, we use another parser to analyze and filter the raw logs into structured data consist-
ing of log keys (exclude useless information like timestamp of specific logs). Next, we encode each
of the parsed log key with a unique number (, HDFS log has 29 log keys mapped to 29 numbers).
Specifically, we count how many unique log keys in the whole data sets, and map each unique
log key (parsed log entries) into a unique number. Finally, we leverage a session windows [25]
to regroup those log keys to different sessions (group). After sorting those log keys (numbers)
with execution order, we get a structured sessions. Thus, each session (group) includes one unique
identifier and a series of related log keys (numbers), such as a session: 5 5 11 ... 26 26
in HDFS log belongs to one block (an identifier). Considering each vector represents an execution
60
path which may vary based on environment settings (different orders), also each path may have
different lengths. For example, some abnormal blocks in HDFS log will be killed after just being
started, so this block only contains few log keys, which has a short length of vector. Hence, we
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Figure 5.1: Architecture of our CNN-based anomaly detection model.
Neural network is a biologically-inspired approach for pattern recognition [8]. In regular fully
connected networks, each neuron is fully connected to all neurons in the previous layer and Back-
Propagation [52] is utilized to compute the error gradient [16]. However, it is not scaled well
for high-dimension data such as images (, images are of size 32 × 32 × 3 in CIFAR-10 [36]).
Inspired by receptive fields of cat’s visual cortex [29], Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) has
been proposed to capture local semantic information instead of global information and defeat the
over-fitting issues in regular neural networks.
Basically, convolution is the core operation applied in the convolutional layers and it extracts
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features from local receptive fields on feature maps of previous layer. An activation function (,
Sigmoid, ReLU (Rectified Linear Units), Tanh) is performed as a non-linear transformation. Fol-
lowing [33], as shown in Eq. 5.1, the value of a unit at position (m,n) in the jth feature map of the















where bij denotes a bias function of this feature map, N indexes over the set of feature maps in
the (i− 1)th layer, Pi is the height of kernel and Qi is the width of kernel, and wpqij is the value of
parameter.
As mentioned as before, Kim et al. [35] first propose a simple and effective CNN model based on
word2vec [50] and vanilla CNN for sentence classification with static and non-static channels
and get preeminent results in natural language processing.
Due to the fact that log file is also one special kind of text, log analysis can also benefit from the
advances of NLP techniques. However, log analysis is different from the general NLP. The long
span relationship widely exists in nature language context, such as a long sentence with complex
structures. But logs only contain small amount of log keys. Moreover, the goal of anomaly detec-
tion is to look for unexpected execution path (log key sequences), which is a binary classification,
whereas NLP tries to classify sentences into multiple categories. During the experiment result, we
found that CNN can achieve better accuracy rather than other approaches for log-based anomaly
detection, such as MLP and LSTM.
As shown in Figure 5.1, in the embedding layer, we create a trainable matrix, e.g., 29 × 128
codebook, to map each log key in a session into a vector. For example, in embedding process,
the log key 5 in session group 5 5 11 ... 26 26 will be encoded to 0.6312, 0.7192,
62
... 0.9887, and the whole session will be encoded as a matrix. We name this embedding
process as logkey2vec. Different from word embedding that uses word as fine-grained unit
such as word2vec, each log key will produce log embeddings based on the 29 × 128 codebook.
The logkey2vec is a trainable layer optimized with gradient decent during the training of Neural
Network. The codebook is used for mapping 1D vector to 2D matrix as CNN input, which is a
more comprehensive mapping to enhance the relationships hidden behind logs.
The next part in CNN is convolutional layers, which convolute over the embedded log vectors
with three one-layer convolutions (filters) in same time. According to our experimental study, we
adopt three convolutional layers in parallel for CNN training after encoding layer, with size of 3
× 128, 4×128, 5×128, respectively, as shown in Eq.5.1, where P = 3, 4, 5, and Q = 128. The
activation function σ is Leaky Rectified Linear Unit (leaky ReLU or LReLU) shown in Eq. 5.2,
due to that leaky ReLU can avoid over-fitting and solve the dead ReLU problem by setting first
part of ReLU to non-zero (a small positive gradient). The dead ReLU problem means that some
of neurons in the network may never be activated, hence, the parameters will never be updated.
The causes of dead ReLU have two aspects. The first one is improper parameter initialization, and
the second one is high learning rate setting which may lead to parameter updating too large. After
three independent convolutional operations, a max-pooling layer is applied to concatenate output
of the convolutional layers. While, for Leaky ReLU, as the gradient in all its domain will not be
0, it will feed back a informative update for each iteration. The max-pooling layer can also reduce
over-fitting effectively by filtering out the weak related features, and leaving the strongest related
features for next layer. Moreover, a dropout function is applied as a regularization in the second-
to-last layer to prevent over-fitting. Finally, a softmax function is added in the output layer. The
softmax function is shown in Eq. 5.3. Moreover, the parameter setting detail of CNN base model
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for each layer is shown in Table 5.1.
σ(x)

x if x ≥ 0
0.1x if x < 0
(5.2)






where ai denotes the ith number of input, i = 1 to 2, T =2 in our implementation.
Table 5.1: network details and specific parameters in our CNN model
Layer Output
Input: vectorized log, size: 1 x 50 --
Embedding with code book size: 29 x 128 
Embedded log matrix
size: 50 x 128 x1
Conv 1: [3,128,1,128], strides=[1, 1], padding="VALID“
Leaky ReLU, max pool [1,48,1,1], strides=[1, 1]
48 x 1 x 128
1 x 1 x 128 
Conv 2: [4,128,1,128], strides=[1, 1], padding="VALID“
Leaky ReLU, max pool [1,47,1,1], strides=[1, 1]
47 x 1 x 128
1 x 1 x 128 
Conv 3: [5,128,1,128], strides=[1, 1], padding="VALID“
Leaky ReLU, max pool [1,46,1,1], strides=[1, 1]
46 x 1 x 128
1 x 1 x 128 
Concatenate Conv 1, Conv 2, Conv 3, dropout 0.5 1 x 384
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Figure 5.2: Architecture of our MLP-based anomaly detection model.
Table 5.2: Network details and parameters in our MLP model
Layer Output
Input: vectorized log, size: 1 x 50 --
Embedding with code book size: 29 x 128 
Embedded log matrix
size: 50 x 128 x1
Avg pool [1,50,1,1], strides=[1, 1], flatten
Dropout 128
FC: [128*128], leaky ReLU
Dropout 128
FC: [128*64], leaky ReLU 64




According to our empirical study, parameter tuning is very challenging for LSTM, it is difficult to
train such a complicated model because of gradient vanish/exploding issues existing in Recurrent
Neural Networks like LSTM. As a result, the accuracy for anomaly detection may decrease. Hence,
we decide to use a simple and clear network with easy adjustable parameters as our baseline to
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compare with CNN in order to prove its efficacy. Therefore, we design a Multilayer Perceptron
(MLP) as our baseline model and also train it on logkey2vec of HDFS logs. Before Deep
Neural Network (DNN), MLP is one way feed-forward layered network which can be built up
with three main layers (input layer, the hidden layers, and the output layer). Basically, the input
layer sent weighted inputs to front hidden layer to learn the relationship and sent middle data to
next hidden layer. Then, the classification results are sent from last hidden layers to output layer.
It consists of three components: input layer, hidden layers and output layer. Each hidden layer is
activated with a non-linear function. BP is often utilized to update the weights of MLP. More than
one hidden layers are designed to increase/decrease the complication of models. The output layer
could be different depending on the objective function.
The workflow of our MLP model for log-based anomaly detection is shown in Figure 5.2. The
input embedding stage is the same as CNN’s logkey2vec, and it encodes vectors using the
same codebook. The parameters of MLP model for each layer are shown in Table 5.2, the hidden
layers are three fully-connected layers without any convolutional layers, and the number of MLP
hidden neurons for each fully connected (FC) layer is 128, 64, and 32, respectively. Following
the CNN model, LReLU is also used as MLP’s activation function. The output of FC layer is
concatenated to a vector by an average-pooling layer.
5.3 Evaluation
In this section, we first introduce the experiment setup, and then evaluate the accuracy of the CNN-
based approach for detecting anomalies in HDFS data sets.
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5.3.1 Experiment Setup and Dataset
Our CNN-based approach is implemented in TensorFlow [4]. We compare the accuracy of our
approach with other deep learning methods in log-based anomaly detection using HDFS log, a
widely used benchmark dataset employed by other approaches [61, 17].
The HDFS log is a dataset generated from running over 200 days experiment in Amazon EC2. The
data was first published by Xu et al. [61], and analyzed by many approaches such as SVM, PCA,
logistic, and LSTM based anomaly detection. The raw log file is 1.55 GB and contains 11,197,954
log entries. Moreover, HDFS log records the states of each HDFS block during job execution time,
and includes 29 unique log keys. Furthermore, the raw data is always parsed with session windows,
and each line consists of unique blockId with related log keys in the parsed format. We leverage
the parsed and labeled ground truth data, which is the same as [17]. It contains normal training set
(4,855 parsed sessions), normal testing set (553,366 parsed sessions), abnormal training set (1,638
parsed sessions) and abnormal testing set (15,200 parsed sessions).
5.3.2 Results
We first assume that CNN model can achieve a better accuracy which compare to other compar-
isons. To prove this point, we evaluate CNN with our MLP baseline model and LSTM model on
HDFS logs.
Due to the fact that both CNN and MLP are supervised approaches, and both require training
before testing, Hence, we first train the CNN model with training data set, and leverage testing set
to evaluate our model. For training detail, we use normal training set from [17], and select 1% of
abnormal testing data set as abnormal training set. Here, the remained 99% abnormal testing set
combines with normal testing set as total testing set. It is the same amount which we described in
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above subsection. Finally, we compare to the CNN and MLP training results with LSTM which is
presented at [17].
Those models are evaluated by the metrics listed blow: True positive (TP) represents the number
of real anomalies that are correctly detected as anomalies by our approach. True negative (TN)
represents the normal cases that are correctly identified as normal case. False positive (FP) presents
the normal scenarios that are incorrectly identified as anomalies. False negative (FN) represents
the abnormal log cases that are identified as normal. Based on the four metrics, we calculate
the Precision (P), Recall, and F1-measure for each tested approaches. Precision is calculated by
Eq. (5.4), which represents the correctly detected anomalies percentage in reported anomalies.
Recall is calculated by Eq. (5.5), which shows the detected true anomalies in all real anomalies.
F1-measure is calculated by Eq. (5.6), which represents the harmonic average of the P and recall.
P =
TP










To compare the accuracy of our CNN model with LSTM and our MLP baseline model, we list all
the evaluation metrics results in Table 6.1. Our CNN achieves better results on all the metrics than
the other two models.
Figure 6.3 compares the accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-measure of our CNN and MLP based
approaches in each epoch of the training using HDFS logs. The red line is our CNN-based ap-
68
proach, and the blue line is the fully connected MLP-based approach without convolution layers.
Figure 6.3 (a) shows that CNN has the higher accuracy. Although both CNN and MLP can achieve
high accuracy finally, MLP starts with lower accuracy and slowly converges to high accuracy after
85 epochs. Figure 6.3 (b) presents that the precision curves of both models have some fluctuations;
however, the curve of CNN model is much more stable than MLP. Moreover, CNN could converge
in high precision after few epochs, and MLP converges after 100 epochs. Figure 6.3 (c) shows the
recall of both models. The recall value of MLP starts at 0 and converges to 98.7 in 20 epochs, and
CNN’s recall is around 0.9 at the beginning, which is much higher than MLP’s recall. Figure 6.3
(d) shows F1-measure of both models, where CNN could reach to a high accuracy in few epochs,
but MLP converges till 90 epochs. All the evaluation metrics show that the MLP model converges
slowly and is more time-consuming than the CNN model on the training of HDFS logs.
To evaluate if the embedding layer could impact the accuracy, we design an extra experiment by
eliminating the embedding layer inside our MLP model. After MLP model trains with a series
of log key vector directly without embedding process, we get the results with accuracy of 0.997,
precision of 0.9732, recall of 0.95044 and F1-measure of 0.961726. Compared with the results
shown in Table 6.1, it demonstrates that the embedding process could cause big difference in the
efficiency MLP for HDFS log classification. It is because that the embedding layer leverages
codebook to encode vector into matrix, and this processing could learn comprehensive semantic
representation of log.
Table 5.3: The comparison of different models on HDFS log.
Model Accuracy (%) Precision Recall F1-measure
CNN 99.9±856e-05 97.7±068e-05 99.3±0035 98.5±0014
MLP 99.89±588e-05 98.12±918e-05 98.04±0036 98.08±0018




(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 5.3: Accuracy procedure of CNN-based approach and MLP-based approach on HDFS logs
(a)Accuracy. (b) Precision. (c) Recall. (d) F1-measure.
5.4 Discussion
This section discusses potential reasons why our CNN-based approach could achieve better accu-
racy than MLP, and LSTM. Furthermore, the reasons of embedding layers using is discussed.
5.4.1 CNN vs. MLP
The experiments show that MLP and CNN models have different accuracy because of two reasons.
First, due to the fact that after the first embedding layer, the related log keys arer sorted, and
our CNN model could use multiple filters to mine more buried relationships which hided among
log keys. Secondly, the learning process of weights is a two-dimensional convolution operation,
hence it considers the correlation between the horizontal embedding, and the longitudinal entries
in logs. Although the MLP approach is quite effective, semantic information can not be leveraged
by training stage.
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5.4.2 CNN vs. LSTM
LSTM has more advantages than other neural network methods for solving NLP sequence clas-
sification problems because LSTM has one kind of units called memory cells to store context
information. The context stored in the previous cells could be used for next memory cells. LSTM
performance will be impacted by three factors when it is employed for anomaly detection. First of
all, word2vec embedding is required in NLP task for word separation, and the log analysis needs
an embedding for log key separation, such as logkey2vec. Secondly, log can be considered as
one kind of execution flows consisting of many log entries (log keys). Moreover, those log entries
could present short time sequence relationship. However, one log entry may have weak relation-
ships with far distanced log entry from it. For example, there are two states in HDFS log, the one
is a start state called Receiving block, and the other one is an end state called Deleting block file.
Thirdly, due to the fact that the network structure of LSTM is more complex and thus the tuning
work for LSTM’s parameters is more difficult. Hence, to achieve a good performance is still a
challenging task for LSTM.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents a novel Neural Network based approach to detect anomaly from system logs.
A CNN-based approach is implemented with different filters for convoluing with embedded log
vectors. The width of filter is equal to the length of a group of log entries. A max-overtime pool-
ing is applied for picking up the maximum value. Multiple convolutions layers are employed for
computing. Then, we add a fully connected softmax layer to produce the probability distribu-
tion results. We also implement a MLP-based model that consists of three hidden layers without
any convolutional kernels. Our experimental results demonstrate that the CNN-based method can
achieve a higher and faster detection accuracy than MLP and LSTM on big data system logs
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(HDFS logs). Moreover, our CNN model is a general method that can parse log directly and does
not require any system or application specific knowledge.
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CHAPTER 6: DETECTING ANOMALIES WITH ATTENTION-BASED
CONVOLUTINGAL NEURAL NETWORK
6.1 Introduction
This chapter extends our previous work [45], which presents a novel approach to detect anomalies
from system logs by using vanilla CNN to explore complex latent relationships effectively. In the
proposed vanilla CNN model, firstly, we design an embedding method named logkey2vec to
embed log keys into feature vectors, which are then fed into convolutional layers, where the width
of filter equals to the length of embedding. Secondly, we apply a max-overtime pooling layer to
select the maximum value of all the features. Finally, a fully connected softmax layer is applied to
calculate the probability distribution results. We train the CNN model with labeled HDFS logs.
In this chapter, we implement a novel attention-based CNN, where the attention mechanism is ap-
plied to the vanilla CNN to improve the accuracy. Due to the fact that partial important log keys or
CNN filter-extracted features may have more relevant impact, our attention mechanism focuses on
using those features instead of whole CNN output. For log analysis, the relevant log patterns need
more attention than the unimportant log entries. We propose two attention schemes that focus on
different features from CNNs output. We compare our attention-based CNN approach with sev-
eral other deep learning approaches, the attention-based CNN model shows the best performance
among comparison methods.
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6.2 Attention-based CNN Approaches
Our previous approach detects anomaly by using logkey2vec and Convolutional Neural Net-
work, but due to the fact that complex relationships exist between log lines, the attention-based
model is able to find more reasonable features. As we stated before, the anomaly detection with
system log should learn non ad-hoc features, hence, the most significant extension in this paper is
that two proposed attention schemes that can learn the hidden relationships among log lines.
To further improve accuracy for abnormal detection through CNN model, we adopt attention mech-
anism to filter out less relevant features among inner output of the model.
Our attention model employs three attention schemes, namely logkey attention, and filter attention.
This model is similar to the CNN model but extended with different attention layers to filter more
related features by modifying the position of attention mechanism in the whole network structure.
All of the attention schemes have the same embedding and convolution parts as our vanilla CNN
models.
6.2.1 Logkey Attention Scheme
In our vanilla CNN model, max pooling is added to the output of convolutional layer to obtain
the maximum value features. However, the related logkey features directly produced by CNN
may be ignored by max-pooling, and those logkeys could bring more accurate results. The logkey
attention scheme consists of three attention layers. Let Am∗n denote the matrix after convolutional
operation, where m and n are the dimensions of A. Formally, given A, we first segment it into
a sequence of vectors a1, a2...an , where ai indicates the ith row of A, our implementation of
attention mechanism computes an output vector c given by a weighted scaling of vectors ai.
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where w is a learnable parameter using back propagation by comparing the ground truth and the
predicted results. Let Λ1∗n denote the matrix of attention weights λ, where 1 and n are the dimen-






























Figure 6.1: Architecture of our logkey attention scheme
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6.2.2 CNN Filter Attention Scheme
Similar to our first attention mechanism, we further propose the second attention CNN model
named CNN Filter attention scheme. The difference from our first model is that we perform
attention operation after maxpooling operation other than replacing it, and the workflow of our
CNN filter attention is shown in Figure 6.2. Actually, for our previous simple embedding-based
CNN model, three independent CNN layers after maxpooling (three vectors with length of 128)
are concatenated into a single vector, and then operate attention operation through attentionOut-
put,attentionOutput2,attention. Typically, for this kind of attention mechanism, we try to find the
relative importance among these three extracted features.
Maxpooling Output
3 * Embedding size
CNN Filter Attention Layer
Attention Output
1 * Embedding size
Learned parameters
w





































Figure 6.2: Architecture of our CNN filter attention scheme
6.3 Evaluation
In this section, firstly, we show the setup experiment and dataset. Secondly, we evaluate the accu-
racy of proposed attention-based CNN method for HDFS log anomaly detection.
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6.3.1 Experimental Setup and Dataset
We implement our proposed approaches with TensorFlow [4]. The dataset we used for evalu-
ation of the accuracy of proposed attention-based approach is HDFS log, a widely used public
dataset [61, 17]. This dataset is first published by Xu et al. [61], and it is generated from an over
200 days running experiment on Amazon EC2, which mainly records the states of each HDFS
block during job execution time. The size of raw data is 1.55 GB and it contains 11,197,954 log
entries, 29 unique log keys. It has been analyzed by few statistical approaches and deep learn-
ing method including offline PCA-based method [61], online PCA-based method [60], Invariant
Mining-based method [43], and LSTM-based anomaly detection method [17].
The preprocessing of the HDFS raw data is usually parsed with session windows, and each line
consists of unique blockId with related log keys in the parsed format. The parsed and labeled
ground truth data is leveraged in our experiment as same as [17]. This dataset contains abnormal
training set (1,638 parsed sessions), abnormal testing set (15,200 parsed sessions), normal training



















Figure 6.3: Performance Comparison of the attention-based CNN approach, CNN-based approach
and MLP-based approach on HDFS logs with respect to (a) accuracy, (b) precision, (c) recall, and
(d) F1-measure.
We compare our proposed attention-based models with six representative approaches including
three deep learning methods (CNN model, our MLP model [45], LSTM [17]), and three non deep
learning approaches (Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [17], Invariant Mining (IM) [17], N-
gram [17]). As shown in our previous work [45], a Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) is designed as
our baseline model which uses a simple and clear network with easily adjustable parameters to
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compare with CNN and LSTM in order to prove its efficacy. The MLP model is also trained on
logkey2vec of HDFS logs, it uses the same input embedding stage as CNN’s and the same
codebook for vector encoding.
Table 6.1 shows the evaluation results with respect to “accuracy”, “precision (P)”, “recall”, and
“F1-measure (F1)”. As shown in Table 6.1, our attention-based CNN model (CNN filter attention
scheme) outperforms the LSTM [17] by 2.89% in F1-measure, 4.76% in recall, 3.04% in precision.
In addition, it outperforms the best non deep learning approach N-gram [17] by 4.89% in F1-
measure, 3.76% in recall, 5.70% in precision.
Figure 6.3 presents the comparison results of the precision, accuracy, recall, and F1-measure of our
proposed attention-based CNN model, basic CNN model and MLP-based approach in each epoch
of the training using HDFS logs. As the CNN filter attention scheme has the best performance, it
is used to compare with others.
Figure 6.3 (a) shows that the attention-based CNN has the best performance in accuracy measure-
ment, and both attention-based and vanilla CNN models achieve good accuracy in a few epochs.
Although all three models can achieve high accuracy finally, MLP converges much slower. Fig-
ure 6.3 (b) shows that the precision curves of those models have some fluctuations; however, the
attention-based and vanilla CNN models are more stable than MLP. Moreover, both CNN-based
models converge in high precision after a few epochs, while the attention-based CNN achieves the
highest precision. MLP converges after 100 epochs. Figure 6.3 (c) shows the recall measurements
of all models. The recall value of MLP converges to 98.04% in 70 epochs. The average recalls
of the attention-based and vanilla CNN is around 0.8 at the beginning, which is much higher than
MLP. Moreover, the attention-based CNN model (CNN filter attention scheme) gets higher recall
than the vanilla CNN. Figure 6.3 (d) shows the F1-measure measurements of all models, where the
attention-based and vanilla CNN models reach to high accuracy in the first few epochs, but MLP
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converges till 90 epochs. All the evaluation metrics show that the attention-based CNN model
(CNN filter attention scheme) achieves better performance than vanilla CNN and MLP, where the
MLP model converges slower than the others.
To access whether the embedding layer (logkey2vec) can improve the accuracy or not, an addi-
tional experiment is designed by excluding the embedding layer in our MLP model. The accuracy,
precision, recall, and F-measure without embedding is 99.7%, 97.32%, 95.04%, and 96.17%, re-
spectively. The comparable results are shown in Table 6.1, the embedding process causes a big
difference in the performance. Due to the fact that codebook is used by embedding layer to encode
vector into matrix, we believe that comprehensive semantic representation among HDFS logs can
be learned by embedding processing.
Table 6.1: The comparison of different models on HDFS log.
Approach acc(%) P(%) Recall(%) F1(%)
LSTM [17] - - 95 95 96
PCA [17] - - 98 67 79
BaseLine IM [17] - - 88 95 91
N-gram [17] - - 92 96 94
MLP [45] 99.89 98.12 98.04 98.08
CNN 99.9 97.7 99.3 98.5
Logkey 99.8 97.91 99.33 98.62
Attention CNN Filter 99.93 98.04 99.76 98.89
6.4 Discussion
This section discusses potential reasons why the attention-based CNN model could achieve better
accuracy, and two different attention schemes and the significance of logkey2vec embedding
are analyzed.
80
6.4.1 Logkey Attention vs. CNN Filter Attention
Since max-pooling layer will ignore some related features, the proposed log key attention is de-
signed to extract logkey related features (codebook) on CNN output directly. In other words, the
logkey attention will identify important logkeys in the whole codebook. The CNN filter attention
considers which CNN tunnel (3,4,5) will produce more valuable features. In HDFS dataset, the
CNN filter attention filters better features and achieves more accurate results.
6.4.2 Attention-based CNN vs. Vanilla CNN
The major difference between the attention-based CNN approach and our prior CNN model [45]
is that the attention model focuses on more reasonable relevant features rather than the features
extracted by max pooling. Moreover, the attention features belong to a subset of whole features.
Hence, the attention-based approach reduces the timing and complexity of learning relationships
between features and improves accuracy.
Considering about deploying CNN to log analysis, the network training includes logkey2vec
embedding layer, and it coverts the vectors inside the two-D matrix. Each row of the matrix
indicates a log key encoding, and each column of the matrix presents the number of log keys that
exists in the log file. The CNN model will think over the contents of each log, then leverages
multiple CNN filters to control the “memory length” with more flexible. This training operation
is more effective than recurrent-based neural networks. In the proposed CNN-based detection
model, there are only 29 unique log keys, also the length of the log is quite stable. In this way, the
embedding is more effective but without dropping useful information. Compare with LSTM, our
CNN-based model is a suitable approach for anomaly detection from system logs.
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6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, an attention-based deep neural network approach is proposed to detect anomalies
from HDFS logs. Our approach includes the logkey2vec embedding, an attention-based CNN
model with two different attention schemes. Our model does not require any expert knowledge and
could provide a high accuracy without the overhead. An MLP-based model and a vanilla CNN-
based model are implemented as the experimental baselines. The experimental results demonstrate
that the CNN filter attention scheme achieves higher accuracy than the basic CNN, MLP, and
LSTM on HDFS logs.
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CHAPTER 7: WHITE BOX ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON NEURAL
NETWORKS FOR ANOMALY DETECTION
7.1 Introduction
Deep Neural Network (DNN) is being adopted in the log analysis domain for higher accuracy
and better automation. For instance, Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) and Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN) are used by [10, 17] to detect anomalies with high accuracy to avoid ad-hoc
feature extraction. Within all deep learning methods, Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is one
of the most famous and widely used approaches. Due to its convolutional layers, the CNN-based
approach can learn spatial relationships with high accuracy. Recently, another important technique,
attention mechanism, has achieved dramatic improvements in many applications. Moreover, those
methods could reach high accurate results for anomaly detection. However, the network’s results
may not be as stable as our thoughts. To the best of our knowledge, there is no work to test the
robustness of neural networks for log analysis so far.
Various adversarial examples could be leveraged to attack target networks [39]. The white-box
and black-box are two popular approaches for adversarial attacking. Due to the fact that a white-
box attacker knows all information of the target networks, which include input data, output data,
parameters, even activation function, and loss function. Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) is
one common white-box approach that was first proposed in the computer vision domain [48]. It
leverages the gradients of testing data to generate adversarial examples. In this chapter, a white-
box adversary attacking is proposed to against our previous attention-based CNN anomaly detector,
and this work is in submission. We first generate adversarial examples according to the attention
weights, and vulnerable logkeys. Then, we leverage three different attack strategies to attack CNN-
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based neural networks for anomaly detection.
7.2 Target Models and Dataset
HDFS dataset and CNN-based model described in Chapter 4 are our target dataset and model.
The network is trained with HDFS dataset, which contains 200 days Hadoop logs on Amazon
EC2. The data was first published by Xu et al. [61], and analyzed by many approaches such as
SVM [19], PCA [61], and LSTM [17] based anomaly detection. The raw log file is 1.55 GB
and contains 11,197,954 log entries. Moreover, HDFS log records the states of each HDFS block
during job execution time and includes 29 unique log keys. Furthermore, the raw data is always
parsed with session windows, and each line consists of unique blockIDs with related log keys
in the parsed format. We leverage the parsed and labeled ground truth data, which is the same
as [17]. It contains normal training set (4,855 parsed sessions), a normal testing set (553,366
parsed sessions), an abnormal training set (1,638 parsed sessions) and an abnormal testing set
(15,200 parsed sessions).
7.3 Methodology
As mentioned before, white-box attacking will leverage all information of the target network. By
using the inner attention weights, network could check whether the model actually focuses on
relevant logkeys. Inspired by this, our adversarial attack examples are generated by leveraging
the internal attention mechanism of target neural networks. We perform a logkey level white-box
adversarial attack by using the models’ internal attention weight distributions to locate vulnerable
logkeys and attack them. Our attacking approach is twofold. Firstly, we calculate maximum
attention weights and identify the related logkeys. Secondly, according to the proposed strategies,
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we can modify the vulnerable logkeys and create test set for attacking.
7.3.1 Identifying the Vulnerable Logkeys
To attack the target neural network, we need to identify which and how many log key will con-
tribute sinificantly to the classification. Hence, we mainly reuse the attention calculation of logkey
attention scheme inside the target network to locate vulnerable logkeys. The attention weight cal-
culation is described in Chapter 4. Inside the target model, the CNN outputs are used for attention












where w is a learnable parameter using back propagation by comparing the ground truth and the
predicted results. Let Λ1∗n denote the matrix of attention weights λ, where 1 and n are the dimen-
sions of Λ. Let E1∗n denote the set of e, where 1 and n are the dimensions of E.
Hence, to identify the vulnerable logkey inputs, we calculate the maximum value of attention
weights λ in testing each batch and locate the vulnerable logkey inputs by analyzing different
CNN filter sizes. However, three CNN filters have different sizes (3,4,5), there should be three
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groups of vulnerable logkeys. To identify which filter could locate better valuable logkeys, we
leverage statistical analysis to calculate the mode, average, and standard deviation of the biases
(distances) between different groups of maximum attention weights position, which are produced
by different sizes of CNN filters (3, 4, 5). We define the position of filter 3 is center, and collect
data by running ten times of the attention-based CNN, and the average result is shown in Table 7.1.
Then, we find that the area scanned by a small size filter (size = 3) is the average public area
under three different filters. Hence, we leverage the suitable CNN filter (size = 3) to locate three
vulnerable logkeys which is shown as Figure 7.1.
Table 7.1: Biases between different filters (filter 3 is center)
Measurement filter 3 and filter 4 filter 3 and filter 5 filter 4 to filter 5
Mod 2 -3 -5
Avg 2 -2 -4
Stdev 1.38 1.92 2.19





















Figure 7.2: Architecture of similarity replacement strategy
After identifying three vulnerable logkeys, we design and apply three different systematic adversar-
ial attack strategies for anomaly detection neural network, e.g., exchanging positions, similarity
replacement, and removing. For exchanging positions, we exchange those three positions of three
logkeys to make a new sequence. For removing strategy, we just simply delete the vulnerable
logkeys. For similarity replacement, we calculate the similarities of vulnerable logkeys with other
logkeys by measuring the Euclidean distances and replace them with the closest one. The simi-
larity replacement strategy is meaningful. The similarity value function of logkey replacement is






where the ∆x presents the distance of vulnerable logkey x and replaced logkey x′.
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The workflow of our adversarial attack approach with similarity replacement strategy is shown in
Figure 7.2. The distance between each vulnerable logkey and other logkey will be calculated in
each logline of test set. Then, the adversarial attack examples will be created by using the shortest
Euclid distance logkeys instead of original vulnerable logkeys.
7.4 Experiments
This section presents a series of experiments of the proposed three attacking strategies. Our exper-
iment is conducted on a sever with 4 GPUs, and our code is implemented in TensorFlow [4]. We
generate our adversarial examples based on our attention-based CNN model.
To evaluate whether the three strategies decrease accuracy, three different strategies are evaluated
by their test set on the same attention-based neural network model. The full normal test set is
leveraged for this experiment as a normal situation without any attacks. After the first normal test
finishes, we run different test sets produced by three strategies. We show our experimental eval-
uation results with respect to accuracy, precision (P), recall, and F1-measure (F1). For no attack
model (normal cases), we get the state-of-art results, the accuracy is 99.8688, precision is 96.86,
recall is 98.72, F1-measure is 97.78. Then, we first remove the fault classification test dataset
and evaluate our three attack strategies based on the correct classification test dataset. Table 7.3
shows that the removing strategy brings some decreases than exchanging positions, and a similar-
ity replacement attacking strategy shows a huge decrease by 34% in F1-measure, 60% in recall,
71% in precision, 66% in accuracy. Moreover, we evaluate our attacking with attack success rate
(ASR) which presents the percentage of adversarial examples that leveraged to be classified as the
target correct class. The highest ASR of our similarity replacement strategy is 66% for correct
classification.
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Table 7.2: The comparison of different attack strategies for correct classification
Strategy Accuracy(%) Precision (%) F1 (%) Recall (%)
Exchanging Positions 99.9 99.99 99.99 99.97
Removing 88.946 1 66.41 79.81
Similarity Replacement 33.98 28.37 65.97 39.67






This section discusses potential reasons why the similarity replacement strategy could achieve a
more effective result, all three strategies and the significance of vulnerable logkeys are analyzed.
For exchanging position strategy, it seems not working at all. Because the logging framework
records different log events in time sequence, usually in normal execution, the same log events
could be printed in a different order, such as 2, 4, 9, 12 and 12, 4, 2, 9, also logkey 2 and logkey 4
always be printed in pair. Even the order of those logkeys changes, those patterns always remain
normal cases. Hence, the position exchanging may not decrease accuracy effectively. For removing
strategy, it achieves some attacking success rate. During this attacking, vulnerable logkeys will be
removed from the normal test set. In other word, this operation will create a new sequence of
inputs without vulnerable logkeys. Because of that, the location of the lesion may have been
cleared, the negative classification will be misled by this strategy. Moreover, the precision does
not decrease, it means the negative data could be classified as correct data because some of the
vulnerable logkeys in negative data are deleted. In this way, we propose a similarity replacement
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strategy for attacking target networks more effective. For similarity replacement strategy, the major
difference between similarity replacement and the other two strategies is that the replaced logkeys
could be highly similar in semantic meaning, which means the replacement may replace the most
likely two logkeys. It will not change too much information such as removing. According to our
data analysis, logkey 6 and logkey 26 are calculated as two similar logkeys, logkey 6 presents
“Served block (*) to (*)” and logkey 12 presents “BLOK NameSystema˙ddSTOREBlock:block
update” in the original dataset. Therefore, vulnerable logkeys are replaced, and the classification
will be fooled. Moreover, it is hard to detect the meaning difference by users. As we know,
the attention-based log analysis neural networks leverage vulnerable features to detect anomalies
instead of using whole feature sets. Our similarity replacement already modifies the most important
vulnerable logkeys in the whole test set. Hence, it could reach the highest ASR, and has a large
effect on the average performance of target neural networks.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, a white-box adversarial attack approach is proposed to attack attention-based neural
networks for anomaly detection. Our approach leverages the internal network attention to create
adversarial examples and applies three adversarial attack strategies on target neural networks. To
prove the brittleness of attention-based models, we find that vulnerable logkeys are sensitive to our
adversarial perturbation by using similarity replacement strategy.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
This dissertation presents four novel approaches to detect anomalies from big data system logs.
First, a statistical rule-based approach is applied to Spark logs for detecting abnormal tasks and
analyzing root causes. Secondly, a GRNN-based approach is leveraged to learn a set of features
weights and avoid ad-hoc weight calculations for abnormal task detection. Thirdly, we implement
a CNN-based approach with different filters for convoluting with embedded log vectors. The width
of the filter is equal to the length of a group of log entries. A max-overtime pooling is applied for
picking up the maximum value. Moreover, multiple convolutions layers are employed for comput-
ing. Then, we add a fully connected softmax layer to produce the probability distribution results.
We also implement an MLP-based model that consists of three hidden layers without any convo-
lutional kernels. Our experimental results demonstrate that the CNN-based method can achieve
higher and faster detection accuracy than MLP and LSTM on big data system logs (HDFS logs).
Moreover, our CNN model is a general method that can parse log directly and does not require any
system or application-specific knowledge. Fourthly, we add two attention schemes on our previous
CNN-based approach to improving accuracy for anomaly detection on the HDFS dataset. Finally,
we leverage the internal attention mechanism to generate adversarial attack examples to prove the
robustness of our CNN-based approaches for anomalies detection.
For future work, more complex system logs will be considered for training and testing. Further-
more, we plan to design an automatic log analyzer that can leverage deep learning approaches to
detect anomalies and classify root causes into multiple classes.
Our research has the following impacts on research and society. First, our research could auto-
matically address detection issues and save a lot of human resources by analyzing logs. Secondly,
we can help people better understand their log files and make the logs more valuable. Thirdly,
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our approach can offer high accuracy to detect the anomalies with the lower misclassification rate.
Fourthly, we use AI-powered approaches to make detection methods smarter.
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